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PREFACE 
This dissertation's origins are in England. On a sabbatical to 
the London School of Economics, my major adviser and dear friend, 
Dr. Ansel M. Sharp, met Dr. Anthony Culyer, a noted English health 
economist. Inspired by the experience and his study at the London 
School of Economics, Ansel carried the seed back to the new country. 
Admittedly overwhelmed by the scope of the project, but interested at 
the same time, I adopted the project as my own. 
This project has been a part of my life and the lives of those 
close to me for a long time. Without the love and support of these 
people, I could not have completed it. In fact, one of the most 
important things I have learned from this dissertation is how important 
family and friends are. To begin, I wish to thank my major adviser and 
dear friend, Dr. Ansel M. Sharp. Ansel's encouragement and patience 
were always there when I needed it. In addition, I would like to thank 
my committee members for their support and constructive advice. I 
benefited greatly from Dr. Joseph M. Jadlow's experience with the 
methodology I used. In addition, Dr. Kent W. Olson and Dr. Patrick B. 
Dorr provided many helpful comments that greatly improved the manuscript. 
Other members of the faculty, especially Dr. Michael J. Applegate and 
Dr. Ronald L. Moomaw, also offered valuable assistance in the earlier 
stages of the dissertation. 
During this project I enjoyed continued and strong support from 
both my parents, Ed and Virginia Jackson. They provided emotional and 
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financial support throughout the project, making our lives much easier 
than they would have been otherwise. In addition, I would like to thank 
my dear wife's parents, C. C. and Mildred King, for their support and 
the many days and nights of lodging while I completed the dissertation. 
Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my loving family. 
My dear wife, Pamela, was always there to help me out and pick me up 
when I needed it most. My daughter, Brooke, was so patient and forgiving 
for the many nights Daddy had to go back to the office. My son, Weston, 
was there with his laugh and smile to boost me in the final stages of 
the project. And lest I forget, I wish to thank God for making all of 
these wonderful people and allowing me to be a part of their lives. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1974 and 1982 health care expenditures in the United States 
increased from 8.1 percent of GNP to 10.5 percent. 1 At the same time, 
medical care prices increased over 118 percent, while the consumer price 
index increased 65 percent. 2 Faced with this alarming and continuing 
trend, critics of the performance of the United States health care 
industry have offered national health insurance as an alternative to 
current market arrangements. In pursuing this path, the market critics 
seek to achieve three broad social objectives concerning health care. 
These objectives are: (1) to insure all persons access to adequate 
quality health care; (2) to eliminate the financial risks posed by 
serious illness; and (3) to control or limit health care costs. 3 
The primary technique offered to achieve the first and second 
objectives involves reducing the price paid by the health care consumer 
at the point of demand. Coinsurance rates vary from the currently 
common range of 20 percent offered by private insurance carriers to zero. 
Unfortunately, insuring access by lowering the price of health care at 
the point of demand creates excess demand. Excess demand leads to 
price increases and these price increases provide the economic stimulus 
for growth of the health care sector. Consequently, the three 
objectives cannot be met simultaneously by demand side policies alone. 
Controls on the supply side must limit the resource flows into the 
1 
2 
industry. If the supply side controls are not successful, the excess 
demands must be eliminated by some form of non-price rationing. 
The approach outlined above is essentially the same approach used 
by England when it formed the National Health Service (NHS). While 
national health insurance proposals do not advocate nationalization of 
the health care sector, there are two basic similarities with the 
British approach. First, the price faced by the consumer is less than 
cost. Second, control over the supply of health care is required to 
offset the incentives designed to insure access to health care. The 
NHS uses both of these approaches to meet similar social objectives. 
Consequently, a study of the NHS's attempt to achieve the three 
objectives listed above should provide valuable information on both the 
strengths and weaknesses of this alternative to the current structure. 
Purpose of Dissertation 
The idea that medical care is a right is not new. Able-Smith 
reports that Nye Bevan, the Minister who introduced the National Health 
Service, said that medical care should be made available to everyone 
h b · f d" 1 d d h · · 4 on t e asis o me ica nee an no ot er criteria. Klarman reports, 
in 1951, that a similar view of the individual's right to health care 
. 5 
was well established in American thinking. Should the citizens of the 
United States choose to make this statement valid for all persons, 
they should be aware of the problems that may be encountered along the 
way. 
This dissertation, in attempting to provide some insight into the 
above problems, has two major purposes. The first is to consider the 
contributions to economic theory related to the public provision of 
health care, the zero-money price rationing of health care, and the 
separation of the concept of health care need from health care demand. 
3 
The second major purpose of the dissertation is to empirically investigate 
three areas of NHS operation. 
Areas of Investigation 
The first area of investigation concerns the NHS's performance in 
allocating health care resources among geographic regions based on 
those regions' medical needs. The analysis will concentrate on the 
regions' hospital sectors. As part of this area of investigation, each 
geographic region's hospital sector's response to need within the 
region will be evaluated. 
In the second area of investigation, we seek to evaluate the 
relative efficiency of the regions' hospital sectors. To do so involves 
estimating a hospital sector production.function using linear programming 
techniques. After estimating the production function, we use this 
information to construct indices of efficiency for each region, and 
then compare these efficiency indices with measures of regional medical 
need and other variables. The objective here is to determine which 
regional characteristics support efficiency and which do not. 
The third area of analysis is related to the second. It explores 
the behavior of NHS hospital doctors in allocating resources. As part 
of this analysis, this section evaluates the hypotheses that doctors' 
utility maximizing behavior will not necessarily support the NHS's 
stated objective of allocating health care resources on the basis of 
medical need. 
Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter II discusses the economic literature related to market 
failure in the medical care market. The literature on market failure 
is divided into two parts. The first part discusses market failure in 
the absence of externalities. The second part discusses market failure 
due to the presence of externalities. 
Chapter III reviews the literature concerning the separate concepts 
of health care demand and health care need. In addition, the chapter 
discusses time prices as a non-money price form of rationing health 
care when the objective is to allocate health care equitably on the 
basis of need as determined by a third party and not by individual 
buyers. It also compares the performance of time prices and money 
prices in achieving equity in the allocation of health care resources. 
Chapter IV presents the findings of the analysis concerning the 
regional distribution of NHS resources on the basis of three alternative 
measures of regional need. The simplist measure of need used to 
evaluate the NHS's performance in achieving its equity objective is 
equal per capita allocations and outputs. Two alternative indices, the 
age-sex adjusted population and the age-sex standard mortality ratio 
adjusted population are also used to evaluate the NHS's performance in 
this regard. 
4 
Chapter V presents the estimation procedure and findings of the 
hospital sector production function analysis. In addition, it reports 
the results of the investigation concerning which regional character-
istics are associated with relative efficiency and relative inefficiency. 
Finally, it presents the findings concerning hospital doctor behavior in 
supporting the NHS's objectives at the regional level. 
5 
Chapter VI sunnnarizes the conclusions of the research. Additionally, 
it presents suggestions for improving NHS performance in light of the 
findings. Lastly, the chapter suggests directions for future research. 
ENDNOTES 
1u. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistica.l 
Abstract of the United States, 1984 (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 102. 
2Ibid., p. 106. 
3Karen Davis, National Health Insurance: Benefits, Costs, and 
Consequences (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 2-5. 
4Brian Abel-Smith, National Health Service: The First 30 Years 
(London, 1978), p. 1. 
5Herbert E. Klarman, "Requirements for Physicians," American 
Economic Review (May, 1951), p. 633. 
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CHAPTER II 
MEDICAL CARE AND MARKET FAILURE 
Private markets may fail to allocate medical care resources 
efficiently. The economics literature concerning these market failures 
can be divided into two groups. The first group concerns market 
failures that can occur in the absence of any externalities associated 
with medical care. The second group concerns market failures arising 
from externalities associated with medical care. This chapter discusses 
each group in turn. 
Market Failure Without Externalities 
Private markets may fail to allocate medical care resources 
efficiently even in the absence of externalities. These market failures 
may arise from several sources. First, a significant group of consumers 
may behave irrationally in their purchase and consumption of health care. 
If they do so, evaluating their behavior using the efficiency criteria 
of welfare economics would be inappropriate. Second, uncertainty in 
both the diagnosis and treatment of illnesses may prevent patients from 
equating marginal costs to marginal benefits. Third, and related to the 
! 
second, competitive behavior of insurance companies combined with their 
inability to evaluate medical care consumers accurately by risk class 
leads to overinsurance which in turn motivates society to consume 
7 
medical care past the point where marginal social benefits equal 
marginal social costs. 
Market Failure Due to Consumer Irrationality 
One would not expect private markets to allocate medical care 
resources efficiently if most consumers behave irrationally with respect 
to medical care. Culyer considers whether the existence of certain 
classes of persons provide sufficient evidence to support this proposi-
tion.1 Three classes of persons cited as evidence of wide spread 
irrationality are: (1) mentally ill persons; (2) unconscious persons; 
and (3) persons who are sick but do not demand medical care. 2 If these 
groups represent most consumers, market critics argue that the principle 
of consumer sovereignty would no longer apply.· Free choice should be 
replaced by a social welfare function prescribing the appropriate 
behavior for medical care consumers. 
Culyer dismisses the first two classes as insignificant for two 
reasons. First, no one expects consumer rationality to apply to these 
groups. Society already makes decisions for these people. Second, the 
number of persons in these groups is relatively small. In addition, 
Culyer goes on to argue that the existence of a large group of these 
persons would not justify the violation of the consumer sovereignty 
of the sane and conscious. 
Culyer examines the last class of persons as an obviously more 
serious case. These "sane and conscious" persons would be considered 
sick by medical experts yet they do not demand care. Can their behavior 
be called "irrational?" Culyer discusses why their behavior may not be 
irrational. He begins by dividing these persons into two groups: 
8 
9 
(1) those who make a conscious decision not to consume medical care, and 
(2) those who do not consume medical care because they do not know they 
are sick. 
Culyer starts his argument by noting that neither group is necessarily 
irrational and therefore they do not provide evidence of wide-spread 
irrationality. 3 Sick persons who consciously choose not to demand care 
may do so because they perceive their marginal costs of treatment to 
exceed their marginal benefits. If they correctly perceive the situation, 
they are rational within the context of welfare economics and there is 
no justification for violating their consumer sovereignty. If they 
perceive the situation incorrectly, then does this necessarily prove 
that they are irrational? Again, Culyer argues that it does not because 
their behavior could be due to a lack of information concerning their 
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Since information is an economic 
good, medical care consumers will acquire it just like any other economic 
good to the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. For 
optimality, some ignorance will exist. For these consumers to be 
considered irrational in the context of our model, they must know that 
their marginal benefits of treatment exceed their marginal costs and 
then choose not to demand care. 
Culyer concludes that even if most consumers fall generally into 
this third group, this is not a sufficient condition to justify an 
allocation mechanism which discounts consumer sovereignty. The 
existence of sick persons who do not demand care does not prove 
. . 1· 4 1rrat1ona 1ty. It may be an indicator of the level of ignorance 
existing within the current system. Whether this level of ignorance is 
optimal or not is an empirical question. The group's ~xistence does 
not provide us with the necessary information concerning the number of 
persons who actually satisfy our defintion of irrationality. 5 
Market Failure Due to Uncertainty 
10 
A second reason markets may fail to allocate medical care resources 
efficiently is associated with uncertainty, both in the diagnosis and 
treatment of disease. Culyer notes that patients often can not calculate 
the cost of treatment in advance or evaluate the quality of treatment 
received. In addition, actuarily fair insurance may not be available due 
to loading charges and moral hazard, which cause .actual insurance 
' d ·1 f · · 6 premiums to excee actuari y air premiums. 
If a patient can not determine the quality of care in advance or the 
cost of the care, how can the patient equate marginal benefits to 
marginal costs? Two institutional arrangements have evolved to deal 
with this problem. The first of these is the doctor-patient relationship 
while the second is health insurance. 
The Doctor-Patient Relationship 
Feldstein notes that the agency relationship between doctor and 
patient develops because it is easier for the patient to tell the doctor 
the relevant parameters of his demand function, such as his financial 
position, insurance coverage, fears, needs, than it is for the doctor 
to give the patient all the necessary information to make the decision 
himself. 7 Feldstein adds that if the agency relationship is complete, 
8 
observed demand would be identical to the demand of an informed consumer. 
But if the relationship is not complete, the two demands will not be 
identical. Titmuss, a critic of market provisio?, argues that technologi-
cal advances and increased specialization of doctors' skills have eroded 
the agency relationship that once existed between the patient and the 
family doctor. 9 In the private market, where the doctor is both a 
demander and supplier of services, the doctor has a financial incentive 
to prescribe higher quantities and qualities of care than an informed 
11 
consumer would demand. Titmuss holds that "the conflict between profes-
sional ethics and economic man should be reduced as far as is humanly 
possible. 1110 His solution is public provision where doctors would not be 
compensated on a fee-for-service basis, as in the British NHS. 11 
While fee-for-service payment schemes provide incentives to increase 
the number of services provided, and may increase the "conflict between 
professional ethics and economic man" as Titmuss warns, complete 
nationalization of medical care is not the only alternative. Prepayment 
schemes, such as HMO's, avoid the possible distortions of fee-for-service 
while keeping medical care resources in private hands. Additionally, 
other aspects of the patient-doctor agency relationship may counter some 
of the adverse effects of the conflict of interest in the agency 
relationship. 
Friedman argues that both patients and doctors can expect to have 
"lower aggregate costs and better""-informed decisions" if they form a 
1 . . 12 ong-term association. Potential benefits from long-term association 
for the patient include shorter waiting time for appointments and free 
services by telephone. The doctor benefits from shorter consultations 
and increased knowledge about his patient. 13 Citing U.S. data for 
1973-75, he notes that the average days wait for an appointment for an 
established patient is approximately 50 percent shorter than for a new 
. 14 patient. 
12 
Long-term associations are available to patients in the United States 
and in England. Increasing specialization and technological change may 
indeed place a patient in "strange hands" but this characterization 
applies to both the United States and England. And, in England, hospital 
doctors (specialists) represent a different group of persons than the 
family doctor (GP). In the United States, family doctors practice in 
hospitals along with specialists. 'one might argue that this would 
facilitate communication between specialist and GP, thus enhancing the 
agency relationship. From the foregoing, Titmuss' argument of effects 
of technical change and specialization would not give the British NHS any 
obvious advantage in terms of an improved agency relationship. So if the 
agency relationship in the United States were found to diverge more from 
the optimum than in Britian, the obvious culprit would be fee-for-service 
compensation. And, as already noted, nationalization is only one 
alternative for removing "the conflict between professional ethics and 
economic man." 
Market Failure and Health Insurance 
Health insurance represents a second institutional arrangement 
which attempts to resolve the problems of medical care consumption 
created by uncertainty. But while conflicts of interest may distort 
the agency relationship between doctor and patient and lead to non-optimal 
results, non-optimal outcomes can also result from both the absence of 
health insurance and the presence of too much health insurance. The 
works of Arrow and Pauly cover these problems. 
The Absence of Health Insurance. A risk-averse medical care 
consumer would purchase health insurance as long as his utility level 
after purchasing the insurance is higher than it would be if the loss 
15 
occurred. The same consumer would self-insure if the purchase of 
insurance leaves him at a comparatively lower utility level. If the 
market fails to provide insurance for certain medical care risks, a 
welfare loss results when consumers who would purchase insurance do not 
13 
have that opportunity. Under these circumstances, Arrow contends a case 
for government provision of insurance exists. 16 
Arrow argues that uncertainty associated with the diagnosis and 
treatment of illness prevents the market from providing insurance against 
certain risks. This non-marketability of risks violates one of the 
principle assumptions of the competitive model and results in a welfare 
. 17 18 loss to society. ' Some risk-averse persons will be unable to 
obtain insurance at an actuarily fair premium (which equals the prob-
ability of a loss multiplied by the amount of the loss). As a result, 
they will self-insure. 
A second reason actual premiums may exceed fair premiums is because 
19 fair premiums are "loaded" with administrative costs and profits. 
If the insurance industry is competitive, these loading charges should 
reflect the alternative costs of the resources providing the insurance. 20 
On the other hand, if barriers to entry or other forces limit the level 
of competition, loading charges will exceed the alternative costs of 
the resources involved. Either way, loading charges raise the actual 
premium above the fair value, and may motivate some risk-averse persons 
to self-insure. 
"Moral hazard" is another reason actual premiums may exceed actuarily 
fair premiums. Pauly cites the insurance industry's definition of moral 
hazard as "the intangible loss-producing propensities of the individual 
21 
assured." In other words, the insured person will demand more at a 
zero price than at the positive price. While the insurance literature 
associates this behavior with morality, Pauly notes that "moral hazard" 
represents rational economic behavior. 22 If the demand for units of 
medical care is not perfectly inelastic and having insurance lowers 
the private marginal cost of a unit to zero, the rational consumer will 
consume medical care to the point 'where private marginal benefits are 
zero. Since this level of consumption exceeds the level where marginal 
benefits equal marginal costs for the uninsured person, the size of the 
loss resulting from a given illness is increased. The insurer will 
recognize this and adjust premiums upward to compensate. Consequently, 
actual premiums again may exceed actuarily fair premiums, resulting in 
some self-insurance among the risk-averse. 
14 
Because actuarily fair premiums are not available, some risk-averse 
persons will self-insure and some welfare loss will result. But Pauly 
warns that this does not provide a sufficient case for the public 
provision of health insurance. He contends that only if the costs 
incurred from an illness are completely random would Arrow's argument 
be valid. The existence of moral hazard makes some medical expenses 
"uninsurable" in the strict sense envisioned by Arrow. 23 While the 
probability of becoming sick may be a completely random variable, 
only a perfectly inelastic demand curve for medical care would insure 
that the actual costs of the illness be completely random. Since actual 
premiums would incorporate the effects of moral hazard, the insurance 
market for certain forms of price sensitive medical care would not be 
observed because most risk-averse persons would self-insure as opposed 
to paying the necessary premium. 
15 
The consumer, as a purchaser of insurance, equates marginal benefits 
to marginal costs. But if the insurance purchased reduces the marginal 
cost of medical care to zero, the consumer, as a puchaser of medical care, 
equates marginal benefits to zero. Pauly concludes that commercial 
insurance will be provided for those events: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
For which the quantity demanded at a zero price does not 
greatly exceed that demanded at a positive price; 
For which the extent- of randomness is greater, so that risk 
spreading reduces the risk significantly, and; 
For which individuals have a greater risk-aversion. 24 
A case for the public provision of health insurance cannot rest 
solely on the presence of risk-averse uninsured persons. Mandatory 
public insurance involves risk spreading over the country's total 
population. Just as with private group insurance, some persons would 
gain at the expense of others. Public provision of insurance must be 
justified some other way. For example, if the increased risk spreading 
over the entire population provides a means of reducing the risk beyond 
that obtainable by the private market, premiums could be lower and net 
welfare gains could result. But if Pauly's three conditions adequately 
describe the insurance that is likely to be provided by the private 
market, all potential gains from risk spreading may have been already 
1 . d 25 exp oite. 
Alternatively, public provision of insurance may realize economies 
of scale in administration. If these economies do exist, loading charges 
would be lower. Actual premiums would exceed fair premiums by a smaller 
amount. As a consequence, fewer risk-averse persons would self insure. 
The Presence of Too Much Health Insurance 
Pauly presents another argument for the public provision of 
insurance. Competition among insurance companies may prevent them from 
charging premiums based on the expected losses of the insured. 26 Based 
on the insured assessment of his (her) needs, the probability of a loss 
varies directly with the amount of insurance bought. The insured's 
expected losses vary directly with the amount of insurance purchased. 
16 
If the insurer knew this, they could identify the persons with larger 
expected losses and charge appropriately higher premiums. If single 
sellers try to increase the price for additional units they sell, the 
customer can simply go to another firm. Pauly argues that the competi-
tion for business will motivate sellers to conceal this information from 
other sellers. This competitive behavior allows the insured to purchase 
more insurance than if insurers knew how much insurance all persons had.· 
purchased. Increased insurance translates into more moral hazard. 27 
Pauly concludes that an optimal result would be produced by a law that 
required individuals to buy exactly the number of units of public 
insurance they would have purchased had premiums varied in accordance 
with their expected losses and no more. 28 
While Pauly states that the public provision of insurance provides 
a solution to the problems created by too much insurance, he goes on to 
recommend that the prefered role of government would be to provide 
insurance companies with information concerning the total amount of 
insurance purchased by an individua1. 29 Given this information, firms 
could charge premiums based on expected losses and individuals would not 
over-insure. Consequently, the level of moral hazard would be reduced 
to the point where the benefits from risk reduction just equaled the 
d 1 1 i f h h f . 30 expecte ass resu t ng ram t e pure ase o insurance. 
Feldstein looks at overinsurance created by private markets in a 
31 different way. As he sees it, medical care consumers are caught in a 
dilemma. For consumers as a group, increased insurance coverage causes 
the price of medical care to increase. The price increase induces an 
increase in the quality of inputs used to produce medical care, which 
reinforces the price increase. This process increases expected losses 
32 from illness and motivates consumers to increase their coverage. 
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This sets off another round of price and quality increases. This places 
the consumer in a vicious cycle that magnifies the welfare loss created 
by moral hazard. Feldstein concludes that substantial net gains to 
society would result by constraining medical care consumers to paying 
higher coninsurance rates. In other words, if medical care consumers 
are forced to pay a larger proportion of their medical costs at the 
margin, the welfare loss from increased risk bearing will be more than 
ff b h lf · f d d · di . 33 o set y t e we are gain ram re uce price · stortion. 
Again, a type of market failure has been identified with uncertainty. 
Without government intervention, it seems unlikely that insurers will 
raise coinsurance rates. Competition among themselves prohibits this. 
If the government could establish a law setting the coinsurance rate at 
some level, price distortion could be reduced. But Pauly warns against 
standardization. He concludes: 
If persons differ (a) in the strength of their risk aversion 
and (b) in the extent to which insurance of various types 
alter the quantity of medical care they demand, an optimal 
state will be one in which various types of policies are 
purchased by various groups of people.34 
Feldstein's article points to another potential problem created by 
insurance coverage for medical care expenses. Increased insurance 
coverage may lead to too much of a country's resources being devoted to 
medical care. Figure 1 begins this argument. 35 Without insurance, the 
market price of medical care is P1 and quantity M1 is provided. When 
insurance is made available with a coinsurance rate (C), the net price 
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consumers must pay falls to CP 1• At this price, M3 units of medical 
care will be demanded. Since suppliers will produce only M1 units at 
price P1, a shortage results which causes price to rise. When the price 
of medical care reaches P2 , an equilibrium quantity of M2 units results. 
If Feldstein's dilemma argument is correct, the attained equilibrium 
will not last. Higher prices induce suppliers to increase quality. If 
consumers perceive the quality to be higher, the demand curve will shift 
h . h 36 tote rig t. Assuming consumers do perceive the quality change, demand 
increases to D1D1 . Consumers facing a net price of CP 2 will now demand 
M4 units of medical care. A shortage of M2M4 units results which drives 
the price up to P3 • The net price faced by consumers is now CP3 , which 
for convenience only, equals the original equilibrium price of medical 
care without insurance. But now quantity M3 is associated with the same 
outlay by the consumer due to the quality induced increase in demand. 
Resource allocation decisions concerning medical care are now based on 
a price of P3 dollars per unit. Without insurance, a lower quality of 
medical care was provided and resource allocation decisions were based 
on a price of P1 dollars per unit. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of the price distortion created 
by medical care insurance on the distribution of the economy's 
resources between medical care and other goods and services. 37 Society's 
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initial position without insurance for medical care is point A on indif-
ference curve w1• Assuming perfect competition in all markets for clarity 
of exposition, the slope of the production possibilities curve (PPC) at 
point A equals the negative of the ratio of the marginal cost of other 
goods to the marginal cost of health care. In perfect competition, price 
and marginal cost are equated so the slope of the PPC is P /P 1• og 
Now point A is clearly not a welfare maximum because risk-averse 
persons are forced to self-insure. Introducing medical care insurance 
with a coinsurance provision would cause the price of medical care to 
rise. If this price increase raises medical care prices to P3 , the 
economy may move past point C to point B where the slope of the PPC is 
-P /P3 . Given the social welfare function drawn, the welfare losses og 
created by the price distortion have now completely offset the welfare 
gains resulting from insuring risk-averse persons for medical care costs. 
Unless someone resolves the dilemma medical care consumers face, futther 
quality increases could actually lower welfare to w0 • Based on the 
arguments presented by Pauly and Feldstein, it is unlikely that 
competitive forces in the market place will be able to resolve the 
dilemma without some form of government assistance. As noted earlier, 
! 
one possibility would be for the government to set minimum coinsurance 
limits. Raising the coinsurance rate above C in Figure 1 would inctease 
the net price to consumers and create surpluses. These surpluses stould 
place downward pressure on prices 
some resources to move out of the 
which would provide incentives for 
medical care sector. This correiponds 
to movement from B toward point C in Figure 2. 
The preceding analysis uses the assumption of perfect competition. 
Monopoly forces, such as the AMA, certainly exist. But many of thei 
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resources in the medical care sector are accounted for by hospitals. In 
the United States, nonprofit hospitals account for the majority of 
hospital assets. If these hospitals have and use monopoly power in a 
conventional way, they will equate marginal revenue to marginal cost. 
The result would be a restriction of output and a restriction of the flow 
of resources into the medical care sector. This would tend to offset 
the expansion of the.sector induced by insurance. But this does not 
occur because non-profit hospitals use the excess revenues generates by 
insurance induced price increases to increase the quality of care 
provided. Quality increases stimulate further increases in demand and 
pull more resources into the medical care sector. 
Market Failure with Externalities 
Critics of the market provision of medical care also attribute to 
externalities part of the failure of private markets to allocate medical 
care resources efficiently. If indivisible external benefits accure to 
others in society from the production and consumption of medical care, 
private production and consumption decisions will be non-optimal from 
38 
society's viewpoint. Culyer discusses three cases involving external 
benefits cited in the economic literature. They are: 
a. Public health activities and innnunization from 
connnunicable diseases, 
b. The provision of sufficient capacity to satisfy 
fluctuations in demand; and 
c. The desire by some rational members in society for other 
rational members in society to consume more medical 
care}9 
23 
Public Health Activities 
Economists generally agree that significant external benefits are 
associated with public health activities and immunization programs. The 
benefits from these activities generally accrue to all members of the 
community. Since it is difficult or impossible to exclude people who do 
not pay from enjoying these benefits anyway, people will be motivated 
to understate their preferences for these activities. This free rider 
problem will prevent private markets from producing an optimum quantity 
of these services and justifies government intervention in one of two 
ways. The government can subsidize private production to provide these 
services at a very low cost, usually zero, to members of the community. 
Financing these subsidies out of general tax revenues reduces the 
number of persons taking a "free ride." To the extent that general 
tax revenues are not regressive, this solution is generally superior 
to a law requiring all persons to purchase immunizations against communic-
40 
able diseases at private market prices. The alternative course of 
' ld . 1 · · f h · 41 action wou invo ve government provision o t ese services. 
Optimum Hospital Capacity 
Weisbrod points out a second type of externality that relates to 
42 
health care. The services of a hospital are needed infrequently by 
most persons and the actual moment of need is uncertain. Furthermore, 
the cost of expanding capacity is very high. Given these characteristics, 
there is a demand for what normally would be considered excess capacity. 
Since all persons would generally benefit from this excess capacity, 
voluntary provision of excess capacity will put the burden for payment 
on current users in a fee-for-service system. Under these circumstances, 
24 
one would expect a suboptimum amount of capacity to be provided by the 
private markets and potential users to benefit without paying, thus 
creating a free-rider problem. 
The British NHS (government provision) represents one possible 
solution to the problem. Financing hospital capacity out of general tax 
revenues will prevent "free rides" of this type. But Culyer and Lindsay 
43,44 
note that government provision is only one possible solution. 
Prepayment schemes, such as HMO's, will also capture option demand. 
Culyer goes on to say that the choice of how to best capture option 
demand depends on which method best approximates the socially optimum 
capacity at the lowest cost. 45 
External Demands for Medical Care 
The third case of external benefits concerning medical care is the 
consumption externality. Culyer believes this issue poses a key problem 
46 
for health economics. How does society deal with persons who do not 
consume adequate amounts of medical care by society's standards? These 
persons impose a disutility on others. This disutility is eliminated if 
they consume more medical care, regardless of who pays. Again, a free-
rider problem exists which prevents market solutions, such as private 
charity, from obtaining optimum results. In attempting to solve the 
problem initial approaches regarded medical care as a merit good. Choice 
was imposed on those with inadequate consumption. But Culyer notes that 
this approach suffered from the inability to make interpersonal utility 
comparisons. There is no way to be sure if the gains outweigh the losses. 
A more promising approach is based on the voluntary exchange theory 
of public finance. By assuming utility interdependence, the 
25 
consumption-externality motive can be evaluated in a gains from trade 
framework without using interpersonal utility comparisons. In this 
approach the individuals consumption of medical care becomes a semi-
public good, providing private benefits to the individual and public 
benefits to a significant segment of society. In the voluntary exchange 
framework, the level of consumption equating private marginal benefits 
with marginal costs falls short of the output where marginal social 
benefits equal marginal cost. 47 Potential gains from trade exist since 
both society and the individual can be made better off, if society 
subsidizes the individual to increase consumption of medical care to 
the point where marginal social benefits equal marginal social costs. 
But because the public good aspect of medical care is not subject to the 
exclusion principle, the free-rider problem will thwart attainment of a 
pareto-optimum unless potential beneficiaries are forced to contribute 
to the subsidy scheme. Public provision, then, provides the means of 
internalizing this externality. 
Figure 3 presents Culyers argument, which he calls the traditional 
48 
approach. Society consists of the persons, Rand P. R's utility is 
a positive function of P's consumption of medical care but P's utility 
is independent of R's. The private demands for each's medical care are 
D and D, respectively. If marginal social costs (MSC) are assumed 
r p 
constant and equal to private marginal costs (MC) each individual will 
consume M and M units of medical care respectively and the total 
r P 
amount provided by the private market will be M units, the horizontal 
sum of these private demands. But, this result is sub-optimal because 
it does not include R's demand for P's consumption (D ). pr 
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To determine the optimum amounts for P to consume and the market to 
provide (M* and M*), the total demand for P's private p 
be vertically added to R's demand for P's consumption 
demand (D) must p 
so (D ). The total pr 
demand for P's consumption is (D + D ). P's optimal consumption is 
P pr 
M* where the "total marginal benefits" of P's consumption of the last p 
unit of medical care equal society's marginal costs of providing that 
last unit. The total amount of medical care the market should provide 
is M* where the horizontal sum of (D + D ) plus D intersects MC. p pr r 
The voluntary exchange occurs as follows. In the absence of 
coercion or subsidy, P will consume M units. At this consumption level, p 
MSB equals Md and MSC equals Mb. If P's consumption is increased to p p 
M*, R's welfare will increase by area bdc. If this increased consumption p 
is brought about by coercion, P would suffer a welfare loss equal to area 
abc. Since interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, we do not 
know the areas of these triangles so we cannot make a case for coercion. 
But the voluntary exchange approach shows that if R subsidizes P to 
voluntarily consume MM* units more medical care, R can increase his p p 
welfare by area M ef while Pis made no worse off. In order to induce p 
P to consume more than M units, R must pay the difference between MC p 
and D, shown by line S . As long as S lies below D , R will benefit P p p pr 
by subsidizing an extra unit of consumption. P's optimum quantity of 
medical care consumption (M*) occurs where D intersects S • P pr p 
Utility interdependency is necessary to make the voluntary exchange 
approach work in this context. Culyer's traditional approach introduces 
the absolute quantities of medical care consumed by Pinto R's utility 
51 
function and shows how consumption subsidies can solve the problem. 
But the reader should note that Lindsay has presented an alternative 
28 
approach that uses a different interdependency term. 52 In Lindsay's model 
the equality of the distribution of medical care between Rand Pis the 
externality term in R's utility function. Faced with different means 
of achieving a more equal distribution of medical care among members of 
society, Lindsay's R's will choose a least-cost approach requiring both 
rationing for the R's and subsidies to the P's. 
Lindsay and Buchanan argue that the type of externality which 
actually exists has important public policy implications. 53 If public 
concern lies in the absolute quantities of medical care consumed by the 
P's, then the appropriate form of government intervention is the pro-
vision of per-unit consumption subsidies to reduce the price of medical 
care to the P's. 54 By lowering the unit price of medical care, the P's 
voluntarily consume more medical care than they would if they were 
. 1 h . f 55 given a ump-sum vouc er or income trans er. This prescription, based 
on Pauly's article on consumption subsidies, requires that the size of 
the subsidy vary inversely with the income of the recepient. It is based 
on the assumption that lower income persons consume less health care and 
create a greater externality from under-consumption than higher income 
56 persons. 
If the relevant externality is the equality of the distribution 
of medical care among all members of society, government provision of 
per-unit consumption subsidies is not the least-cost method of achieving 
equality in the distribution. As noted earlier, Lindsay showed the 
least-cost approach to achieving distributional equality is a combination 
of subsidies to the P's and rationing for the R's. If administered 
correctly, this combination will promote equal access to society's 
medical care resources for both groups. Lindsay and Buchanan warn 
that equal-access preferences do not necessarily justify an "everything 
57 free" system. Without funding the medical care system sufficiently 
29 
to meet all demands, the relatively scarce resources must be rationed by 
time prices. Since time prices vary among individuals, equal access is 
not assured. Lindsay and Buchanan conclude that equal access can only 
be assured if medical care could be obtained by all at no cost, including 
58 
the cost of time. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEED, EQUITY, AND TIME PRICES 
Chapter II discussed market failures associated with medical care 
resources allocation. The existence of sources of market failures not 
associated with externalities indicated areas where government inter1-
vention could improve economic efficiency. But the solutions did no't 
necessarily require direct government takeover of the resource allocation 
mechanism and the factors of production. Even in the case of a signifi-
cant consumption externality, coercive financing of medical care for any 
target group did not necessarily prescribe nationalization of the medical 
care sector, national health insurance being an alternative. Nevertheless, 
the British took this approach in founding the NHS. 
By founding the NHS, the government partially replaced consumer 
sovereignty concerning medical care with a social welfare function 
which states that medical care resources should be allocated solely ,on 
the basis of medical need. 1 The NHS represents only a partial replJce-
j 
ment of consumer sovereignty because the consumer still has some fr~edom 
I 
of choice, e.g., which GP to see, to go to the doctor or not, or to I 
consult a private practice physician. 2 On the other hand, the financial 
ability to pay a money price does not guarantee a medical care cons~mer 
immedicate treatment or treatment at all. The constraint imposed by 
the NHS's social welfare function requires that the individual's need 
34 
35 
rank sufficiently high on a needs priority basis to receive care, gtven 
the resources available to the NHS. 
To evaluate how the NHS allocates resources while attempting t0 
satisfy this equity objective, this chapter first discusses the concepts 
of demand and need. After developing the concept of need, the secorid 
part of the chapter discusses resource allocation using time prices. 
The final part of the chapter evaluates the suitability of time prices 
in helping the NHS achieve its equity objective. 
Demand Versus Need 
Health planners often use the term "need" to discuss what they think 
"ought to be consumed" in the context of medical care resource allocation. 
The term implies an external judgment that someone (or some group) needs 
something. The word demand, on the other hand, implies a choice made by 
a consumer. In making this choice, a consumer's perception of his need 
for medical care is only one factor among many that determine whether the 
consumer demands medical care. Feldstein points out that resource 
allocations based on the needs of a given group may vary considerably 
3 from allocations based on the group's demands. Resources that are needed 
may not be demanded. To successfully allocate medical care resources on 
I 
the basis of need and avoid waste, the demand for medical care must,be 
understood. The following will first develop the concept of demand'and 
then need. The interaction of these concepts will also be considered. 
The Demand for Medical Care 
While the demand for medical care has been viewed solely as the 
demand for the control and/or management of actual or potential 
diseases, health care economists point out that the demand 
care is a derived demand. 4 Medical care is not the direct 
for medilal 
utility 
producing entity for most people. It is one of many inputs used to 
36 
produce good health. Other key variables include diet, exercise, housing, 
environment, genetic endowment, and education. 5 
Good Health as a Capital Stock 
6 Good health is similar to a capital stock. The above "investment 
activities" increase the stock while aging, bad consumption habits, and 
a failure to invest will ultimately decrease the size of the stock. 
The stock of good health provides direct utility from feeling well and 
indirect utility by increasing the amount of healthy time available 
for other activities. 7 The stock is subject to depreciation whose rate 
eventually increases with age. To the extent that the individual has 
some control over the input to the key variables, one can argue that the 
individual chooses a health stock that maximizes utility, given the 
physical and economic constraints existing at the time. 
The physical and economic variables interact to determine the rate 
of return on investment in the health stock. As aging increases the 
! 
depreciation rate on the stock, a larger current investment is necessary 
to maintain a given health stock. Ceteris paribus, one would expect 
people to choose a lower stock as they age. 
Education increases income by increasing the productivity of 
working time. The increase in income enables the person to invest in 
better housing and possibly a better environment. In addition, 
education makes the individual more aware of destructive consumption 
habits and enhances one's ability to combine health-promoting inputs 
efficiently. 
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Culyer argues that higher income persons will be healthier, even if 
all other factors are held constant. To the extent that higher incomes 
are correlated with higher real wage rates, the value of healthy time 
will increase. As time used in the production of good health increases 
in cost, individuals will have an incentive to devote less time to this 
activity. But the benefits from the investment have also increased and 
Culyer argues, on balance, that the increase in benefits should outweight 
the increase in costs. 8 
The Demand Process 
The capital stock approach emphasizes that medical care is only one 
form qf investment in good health. In order to analyze the demand for 
medical care, the degree of complementarity and substitutability with 
other inputs must be controlled for. Likewise, medical care is made up 
of many components (treatments) which allow various degrees of substitu-
tion. For example, to analyze the demand for hospital in-patient 
treatment of a disease, one must consider the other possible treatments 
of the disease. In order to move from the general investment in good 
health to the demand for specific forms of medical treatment, Feldstein 
9 has developed a model of the demand process. Feldstein's model of the 
demand for medical care has three phases. The first phase involves the 
patient, the second the physician, and the third the demand for the 
various forms of medical care. It emphasizes the importance of the 
interaction between the patient and physician in the demand process. 
The Patient. Feldstein divides the variables affecting the patient's 
demand for medical treatments into three groups. The first group is 
incidence of illness. The frequency and type of illnesses one 
38 
experiences shapes the individuals perception of his need for medic91 
care. Whether this perceived need is translated into a demand depedds 
on the interaction of illness with the other variables. 10 
I 
The second group of variables are cultural-demographic factors. 
Feldstein describes these factors as the physiological condition, 
I 11 
perception of illness, and attitudes toward seeking medical attentiqn. 
Since these variables cannot be measured directly, Feldstein suggests 
that population characteristics be included as proxies. These proxies 
. 1 d . t 1 t t f il · d · d · d 12 inc u e age, sex, maria s a us, am y size, e ucation an resi ence. 
The third group of variables are the economic factors. These 
economic factors include the prices of the related forms of treatment 
(including the specific treatment), the patient's income, and the 
presence of health insurance. 13 These variables interact to determine 
if the patient demands care and what type of care is demanded. 
The Physician. The second phase of the demand process involves the 
physician. Feldstein groups the factors affecting the physician's use 
of the various components of medical care into four groups: (1) patient 
characteristics; (2) institutional arrangements; (3) physician's 
knowledge; and (4) the relative costs of various treatments to the 
I 
physician. 14 In this agency relationship, both the patient's inter1sts 
and the physician's interests are accounted for. Groups (2) and (4) 
emphasize that factors other than the patient's interests may dilute 
the agency relationship. The physician's knowledge provides a constraint 
! 
or the choice set of treatments offered the patient. I 
I 
Derived Demand. The third phase of the demand process covers the 
actual derived demands for the various components of treatment, e.gj, 
I 
hospital care, physician care, referrals to specialists, etc. 15 The 
framework then shows how patient characteristics are translated into 
derived demands, subject to the distortions of institutional relation-
ships, the physician's self-interest, and limitations of available 
treatments. 
The Need for Medical Care 
The economics literature contains several definitions of need. A 
representative definition, presented by Williams, states "a need for 
medical care exists when an individual has an illness or disability 'for 
16 
which there is an effective and acceptable treatment or cure." As 
long as a treatment yields either physical or psychological benefits, a 
39 
need exists. A need does not exist if there is no treatment that provides 
either physical or psychological benefit. 
While most physicans might agree with Williams' defintion Culyer 
finds fault with Williams' definition because it does not deal with the 
relative costs and benefits of treatment. 17 Williams' definition is 
based on a subjective third party evaluation of benefits only. SomJone 
must decide if there are any positive benefits from treatment. Cul~er 
argues that to ignore the costs in relation to the benefits is to avoid 
the resource allocation decision that is involved. I According to Culyer, 
I 
if the costs to society outweight the benefits, a need may not exist 
I 
in the sense that it justifies an allocation of scarce medical care 
resources. 
Most other definitions of need also involve a judgment by a third 
party, based on current medical knowledge, that someone should receive 
d . l 18 me 1ca care. The medical expert is usually the third party chosen, 
40 
although Culyer and Williams both point out that society also shoul¢ have 
19 I 
a say. In fact, serious resource allocation problems may result if the 
society does not participate in the decision or provide social and ethical 
guidelines for the medical expert to follow. In the absence of these 
guidelines, the medical expert may make decisions on technical medical 
criteria without considering the costs and benefits. If this happe~s, 
too many resources may be devoted to medical care in relation to other 
uses. 
J ff B d B 1 h . i 20 e ers, ognanno, an art ett support tis v ew. They start 
their argument by distinguishing between need, a quantity determined 
by the medical experts, and wants, the total quantity of medical care 
demanded by consumers at a zero price. They conclude that consumer. 
ignorance will generally prevent the quantity of medical care wanted 
from equaling the quantity needed. Furthermore, while wants may exceed 
needs for some persons, wants will generally fall short of needs for the 
21 popoulation as a whole. Figure 4 adapts Jeffers et al.'s discussion 
to the NHS. In the current time period, medical care consumers will 
demand OW units of medical care if the price of medical care is zero. 
If medical care experts have their wishes, ON units will be allocated 
and,the market price will fall to zero. Consumers will demand OW u~its. 
22 i The remainder (WN), representing unmet needs, would not be used. The 
I 
demand curve (DD) represents society's total demand for medical care with 
the existing level of consumer ignorance. Due to competing wants, 
I 
society will be unwilling to satisfy all quantities demanded at a z~ro 
price. Consequently, the vertical supply curve (SS) represents thei 
quantity of medical care society will provide. At this level of 
provision, the market clearing price will be P0 . The quantity of 
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Figure 4. Demand Versus Need for Medical Care 
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unmet need will increase from WN to SN, since some needy consumers are 
priced out of the market. 
Cooper argues that the NHS was founded on fundamental misconceptions 
concerning medical need. 23 First, the level of need (ON) was thought to 
be a finite quantity that could be determined with great certainty. 
While the founders of the NHS knew that society could not currently 
provide (ON) units of medical care, they believed that the quantity 
needed, being finite, could be reduced each year until the pre-NHS 
backlog was eliminated. Eventually, the quantity needed would fall 
below the quantity provided (OS), allowing the government to reduce the 
size of the NHS. By setting the money price of medical care equal to 
zero, the founders believed no one in need would be deterred from 
demanding care. Excess demands in the years of the NHS would be 
satisfied on a needs priority basis as resources become available until 
all demands which represented needs could be satisfied in the current 
year. But need is not a finite quantity. The quantity of need is a 
function of medical knowledge. As medical knowledge advances, more and 
more treatments exist which provide some positive marginal benefits. 
In fact, advances in medical technology may actually increase needs by 
increasing our life spans. For example, persons who previously died of 
pneumonia now die of cancer, a much more costly disease. This first 
misconception, then, is that society could afford a level of provision 
that would eventually reduce medical nee.Is to a quantity that could be 
satisfied with current period allocations. 
The belief that medical need could be determined with great 
certainty was another misconception. Uncertainty in diagnosis also 
exists. Consequently, .it is difficult to rank needs on a priority 
43 
basis. Even if society could allocate sufficient resources to reduce the 
absolute level of need faster than medical knowledge expanded it, doctors 
would still have to allocate scarce resources among competing demands. 
For example suppose the current level of provision (OS) equals the total 
estimated need of the population. Assume total demand still equals DD 
in spite of this reduction in need. If doctors cannot determine ali needs 
with certainty and rank them accordingly, how can society be sure that 
all medical needs are satisfied? Uncertainty will also increase the 
chance that some consumers (not necessarily hypocondriacs) will demand 
care that is not needed and doctors will provide care to some persons 
with lower priority needs than others who are in greater need but are 
priced out of the market. 
Allocating medical care on the basis of medical need, at best, then 
is allocating medical care resources among those who demand care on a 
needs priority basis. To the extent that uncertainty motivates doctors 
to provide treatment or referrals, when in doubt, doctors may provide 
rationing on a needs-priority basis for only easily diagnosed illnesses. 
Other diseases, for which the diagnosis and treatment are not so obvious, 
may be allocated resources on some other basis. 
Resource Allocation and Time Prices 
As discussed in the previous section, the founders of the NHS ~as 
a very naive view of medical needs. This led to another serious mi~take. 
They granted NHS doctors clinical freedom. 24 Clinical freedom meant 
that doctors resource allocation decisions were not subject to account-
ability in terms of their efficient use of resources. No standardized 
f d ld b i d h · d. . d 1 d 25 concept o nee cou e mpose on t e in 1v1 ua actor. The 
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doctor's choice of treatments was a matter of concern to his patient 
only. Consequently, NHS managers had no assurance that the NHS's 
relatively scarce resources would be allocated on a needs priority 
basis. 
Another mistake was to believe that abolishing money prices fat most 
forms of medical care would ensure that all those who needed care would 
I 
demand care. By abolishing money prices, the founders were implicitly 
! 
adopting resource allocation by time prices, subject to the individ~al 
doctor's non-uniform views of relative medical needs. 26 The following 
sections first consider the role of time in allocating scarce resources 
and then discuss the rationale for favoring time prices for allocating 
medical care resources. 
The Role of Time in Resource Allocation 
Becker's work extended the theory of consumer behavior beyond'the 
allocation of money income to maximize individual utility functions. 27 
His theory also explains how individuals allocate their time among 
different activities in the process of utility maximization. Treating 
households as producers of utility-producing commodities, Becker's 
theory predicts that households will combine inputs of market goods and 
! • 28 time according to the cost minimization rules of the theory of the firm. 
The utility maximizing quantities of these commodities are determintd 
by maximizing the household's utility function, subject to the relative 
i 
prices of the commodities in the utility function and a total resoutce 
constraint. 
Commodity prices in Becker's theory consist of two components:, 
per-unit cost of the market goods used and the cost of the time reqJires 
45 
to produce a unit of the commodity. For the commodity health care, then, 
the price can be represented by the following equation: 
(P * M) + (W * t) 
m m 
where PH the full commodity price of a unit of health care, 
p the price of a unit of medical care; 
m 
M the quantites of medical care, 
t time required to produce a unit of health care, and 
m 
w the foregone earnings rate of 
Beckers calls the market goods component 
the time component (W * t) the indirect 
m 
the household. 
(P * M) 
m 
. 29 price. 
the direct price and 
(1) 
The consumer's resources consist of money income (market goods) and 
time. Money income consists of earned income (W * T) and unearned 
. w 
income (V). Time (T) consists of work time (T) and consumption time 
w 
(T ). Becker combines these two resources into a concept of total income 
c 
equaling the sum of unearned income (V) plus the total value of the 
consumer's time (W * T). 30 Equation (2) represents the consumer's total 
resource constraint on utility maximization: 
V + (W * T) - (P . *Z.) 
Zl. l. 
0 31 
where P . and Zi represent the full prices and quantities of the 
Zl. 
individual commodities. The constraint stresses the point that time 
(2) 
not used in the.production of earned income is used in some form of 
consumption. Increases in the foregone earnings rate will increaselthe 
value of time and change relative commodity prices while changes inl 
unearned income leave relative commodity prices unaffected. 
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In maximizing utility, the consumer will equate his marginal rate of 
substitution of the commodity health care for other utility producing 
commodities to the ratio of the full commodity prices. This determines 
the utility maximizing quantities of these commodities. 32 At the same 
time, efficiency in the production of these commodities requires thlt the 
I 
consumer equate the marginal rate of technical substitution of market 
I 
goods for time to the ratio of their prices. 
I Figure 5 indicates how consumers Rand P substitute market goo4s 
I 
(medical care) and time in the production of a given quantity of th~ 
commodity health care. Consumer R has a relatively high foregone earnings 
rate (R). If each consumer pays the same money price for a unit of 
medical care (P ), R will choose to use relatively more medical care (M) 
m r 
and relatively less time (T) to produce the same utility maximizing 
r 
quantity of health care (H0) than P, whose efficient quantities are Mp 
d T . l 33 an respective y. p Given the relative productivities of medical 
care and time in the production of health care, shown by the slope of the 
isoquant H0 , economic efficiency requires that both consumers be abie to 
substitute medical care and time in the production of health care ai 
technology permits. Becker's analysis predicts that consumers will. 
substitute goods intensive production techniques for time intensive1ones 
as their foregone earnings rates increase. 34 
The Rationale for Time Prices 
If society considers medical care a merit good then the equity of 
the distribution of medical care among the members of society is 
important. 35 Allocating medical care by the financial ability to pay 
may not provide a sufficient degree of equity in the distribution. 
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As shown in Chapter II, some form of subsidy may be desirable to induce 
target groups to consume more medical care. The question society must 
answer is how to increase the target population's consumption of the 
merit good at least cost without making these persons worse off. 
Generally speaking, two alternatives are available. Society can augment 
the income of the target group by providing income transfers or non-
transferable vouchers for a certain quantity of medical care. 
Alternatively, the merit good can be offered to the target population at 
a lower (subsidized) price. 
Clearly the income transfer will place the recipient on his highest 
possible indifference curve. The non-transferable voucher may provide 
an equal result but will never surpass the income transfer from the 
i . I i . 36 rec pient s v ewpoint. Why, then, should society choose any other 
means of increasing the recipient's consumption of the merit good? 
Because the members of society who make the transfer have utility 
functions that are affected by the target groups consumption of medical 
care but not by the target group's utility level. And from the givers' 
viewpoint, the issue is to bring about the desired result at the 
lowest cost. 
Returning to the gains from trade framework discussed in the 
previous chapter, redistribution of income from the givers (the R's) 
to the recipients (the P's) should make no one worse off while making 
someone better off. Faced with the political reality that some form 
of redistribution of wealth will take place, the R's may seek to 
impose their preferences on the P's in return for this redistribution. 
The R's, then may prefer to make the P's better off by giving them 
medical care as opposed to money. In a majority voting system, the 
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redistribution forthcoming which addresses the interdependent element of 
the R's utility function may make the P's better off than a politicllly 
possible alternative redistribution of wealth that does not. In other 
words, the R's may be willing to redistribute more wealth in the form 
of medical care than in money income. The redistribution in kind 
(medical care) directly addresses the utility interdependence while a 
redistribution in the form of money only indirectly addresses it. The 
I P's end up on a higher indifference curve than they would with a 
politically possible redistribution of income. 
Figure 6 demonstrates this situation. 37 It compares P's choice 
between medical care (X) and a (numeraire) good (Y ). For simplicity, p p 
the unsubsidized price of medical care equals the price of the numeraire, 
which is one. Initially~ Pis in equilibrium at point A. He purchases 
! 
5 units of X and 5 units of Y. 
Assume that at P's current consumption level of good X, marginal 
social benefits exceed marginal social costs. R will be able to 
increase his own utility by subsidizing P to consume more good X. Suppose, 
given the price of medical care, marginal benefits equal marginal social 
costs when P consumes 20 units of good X. R can motivate P to conume 
! 
10 units of good X in two ways. He can purchase 10 units of X for P. 
This will move P to point D. 38 As a second approach, he can lower P's 
price of good X to the point where the ratio of the subsidized pric9 of 
go_od X to the price of good Y just equals P's marginal rate of substitu-
tion between the two goods when P consumes 10 units of good X. The 
second approach will move P to point c. 39 
As the indifference curves indicate, Pis unquestionably better off 
if R purchases 10 units of good X for P. Given P's preferences, he will 
y 
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reduce his own purchases of good X to zero and spend his income on good Y. 
This places him on indifference curve IV. 
But R does not look at it this way. R is concerned about the 
quantity of good X P consumes. How can he motivate P to consume 10 units 
of medical care (good X) while minimizing the redistribution of wealth 
that will occur? The first approach, which moves P to point D, requires 
a transfer of 10 units of wealth, since the price of medical care equals 
the price of the numeraire. The second approach involves reducing the 
price of medical care to P by one-half. This costs R five units of 
wealth and moves P to point C. Pis clearly not as well off in this 
case but is better off than at point A. 
One might ask another question. Why not transfe.r five units of 
good X to Pas opposed to subsidizing the price P pays for good X? 
This transfer will move P from point A to point Bon indifference curve 
III, a higher level of satisfaction than point C. The generalized 
transfer of good X will make P better off at no additional loss of 
wealth to R. But this approach places Ron a lower indifference curve 
than when P's equilibrium is point C. Why? Because P consumes only 
7.5 units of medical care at point B. R will gain utility as P 
increases consumption from 7.5 to 10 units of medical care at no addi-
tional cost to R. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the subsidy method is appropriate when 
the absolute quantities of P's medical care consumed enter R's utility 
function. But Lindsay and Buchanan have noted that equality in the 
distribution of medical care may be the relevant interdependency. If 
so, Lindsay has shown that the subsidy method alone· is not the least 
cost approach. The least cost approach requires both a subsidy to the 
P's and some form of rationing for the R's. 
Nichols, Smolensky, and Tideman have shown that waiting time can 
play an important role in achieving the above objective. 40 Noting that 
merit goods such as medical care are often offered to the P's at zero 
money prices, they further point out that the quantity supplied falls 
short of total demand at a zero money price. In order to ration the 
good among demanders, the providing authority allows waiting times to 
increase to eliminate excess demand. This method has the advantage of 
directly discriminating by wage rates without imposing administrative 
costs on the providing authority. If wage rates are highly correlated 
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with income, and the demand for medical care is higher for higher income 
individuals, time prices may actually increase the equality of the 
distribution of medical care between income groups. Now the price of 
medical care to each consumer equals the person's foregone earnings 
( ) 1 1 • d • h d d I • • ( ) 41 rate W mu tip ie times t e eman er s time input t . 
m 
Those with 
higher incomes and higher foregone earnings rates will pay a higher time 
price for a given time input. The higher price will decrease the 
quantity of medical care demanded. On the other hand, those with lower 
incomes and lower foregone earnings rates will pay lower time prices 
for a given time input. This will increase the quantity of medical 
care they demand. 
Time Prices, Money Prices, and Equity in the 
Distribution of Medical Care 
Becker's theory provides a way to determine under what conditions 
zero pricing will increase equity in the distribution of medical care. 
According to Becker, the full price of consumption is the sum of the 
direct (money) and indirect (time) price and these direct and indirect 
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prices are "symmetrical determinants" of total price. To emphasize this 
symmetry, Becker presents the following example which applies to the 
' . ' f d' 1 42 zero-money price provision o me ica care. Assume the commodity 
"health care" (H) is initially produced with medical care (M) and zero 
consumer time (t ), so that the money expenditure for medical care 
m 
(P * M) represents the full commodity price for H. If the money price 
m 
of medical care (P) is reduced to zero but producers are subsidized 
m 
to provide the same quantity of Mas before, the price of H will not 
fall to zero. Holding the demand for H constant, relatively scarce M 
must now be rationed by time prices. Since the total quantity of M 
supplied is held constant, the full price of His a time price which, 
given the average foregone earnings rate of health care consumers (W) 
equals (W * t ). This, in turn, equals the price of H when the money 
n 
expenditure for M reflected H's full price (P * M). In other words, 
m 
the price of H changed from solely a money price to solely a time price 
but the full price of H remained constant. 
To determine the conditions necessary for a time pricing system to 
increase the equality of the distribution of medical care among persons 
of equal medical need, consider a simple society consisting of two 
persons, Rand P. Each have different foregone earnings rates, which 
are W and W respectively. Assume both persons have equal medical 
r P 
needs and that R's and P's independent utility maximization yields 
demand curves, D and D respectively. Further assume that both persons 
r P 
have equal time input requirements (t) for obtaining a unit of medical 
m 
care. In addition, and for simplicity, assume one unit of medical care 
is used to produce a unit of health care. 43 
54 
Figure 7 compares resource allocation with money prices and time 
prices and their respective abilities to increase the equality of the 
distribution of medical care between Rand P, given the above assumptions. 
Following Becker's example, assume medical care is initially allocated 
between Rand P by a single money price only. Although Rand P have 
equal medical needs, individual differences in other determinants of 
demand lead R to demand a larger quant·ity of medical care than P for 
. . 44 
any given price. Given the single money price (P ), R will demand Q 
m r 
units while P will demand .Q units of medical care. The total quantity p 
of medical care supplied equals (Q + Q ). P r 
Now suppose the suppliers of medical care are subsidized to produce 
the same total amount and the money price of medical care is reduced 
to zero. At a zero money price, Rand P now demand Q and Q units Po rO 
respectively. Since their total quantities demanded now exceed the 
subsidized level of provision (Q + Q ), the time required to obtain 
r p 
a unit of medical care rises from zero until the cost of time to each 
individual constrains their total quantities demanded to within (Q + Q ). 
r p 
The distribution of the medical care provided is now determined by the 
time prices Rand P pay, which are (Pt = W * t) and (P = W * t) 
r m t p m 
r P 
respectively. 45 As drawn, the differences in these time prices completely 
offset the other differences in the determinants of demand and both 
. d. . d 1 Q · f d · 1 46 in ivi ua s consume units o me ica care. 
e 
In this simple two person world, the NHS equity objective is met. 
Both Rand P, who have equal needs, demand the same amount of medical 
care. In this instance, time prices decrease the differences in R's and 
P's quantities demanded compared to a single money price for both. While 
the same result could have been achieved by charging Rand P different 
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money prices equal to Pt and P 
r 
administrative costs in doing 
t p 
so. 
respectively,·the NHS would incur 
In general, a pricing scheme will support the NHS's objective if 
it reduces the differences in quantities demanded between persons of 
equal medical needs. Up to a point, time prices which vary directly 
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with the demand for medical care after controlling for medical need will 
provide greater equality than a single money price charged to all. 
However, if time prices increase more rapidly than demand, beyond some 
limit they may actually bring about greater inequality than a single 
. 47 
money price. 
Figure 7 can also be used to describe a second case where time 
prices will increase inequality as opposed to decreasing it. Suppose 
foregone earnings rates vary inversely with the demand for medical care. 
A single money price led R to demand Q units while P demanded Q units. 
r P 
If P's foregone earnings rate (W') is greater than R's (W'), P's time p r 
price (P' = W' * t) will now exceed 
t p m p 
these time prices, R will now consume 
R's (P' 
t 
r 
Q' while 
r 
W' * t). Faced with 
r m 
P will consume Q'. The in-p 
equality of quantities demanded among these persons of equal need increases. 
Another potential source of increased inequality from time prices 
concerns the composition of R's and P 's incomes. 
0 
For illustration, 
assume Rand P have identical total money incomes. In addition, all 
other determinants of demand are identical, giving Rand P the same 
demand curve for medical care (D ). The only difference between Rand 
r 
Pis in the composition of their total incomes. Assume P's proportion 
of unearned income is larger than R's. For this to be the case when 
work times for both individuals are assumed equal, R's foregone earnings 
rate must exceed P's. Given that both individuals must invest the same 
amount of time to obtain a unit of medical care, R's time price (Pt) 
r 
will exceed P's (Pt). Under a time pricing scheme, R will demand Qe 
units while P will ~emand'Q' units. 48 Alternatively, under a single 
r 
money price scheme, both Rand P would demand Q units. 
r 
If NHS doctors are likely to allocate a significant portion of 
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scarce medical care resources on demand when medical needs are difficult 
to identify and rank on a priority basis, time prices will increase 
equity (within limits) between income groups when time prices vary 
directly with income (and demand). 49 On the other hand, time prices 
will increase inequality within the same income group if foregone 
earnings rates, and consequently time prices, vary among members of the 
same income group. Working poor persons will end up consuming less 
medical care than poor persons receiving some form of income maintenance. 
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of the expression for the commodity price. 
42Ibid., pp. 515-516. 
43For simplicity, this means the price of health care (PH) will 
equal the price of medical care (P ). 
m 
44rn this example, the foregone earnings rates directly related to 
the magnitude of the other determinants of demand, such as income and. 
education. 
time 
45since real supply and real demand are held constant, the average 
price ((P + P )/2) equals the average foregone earnings rate of 
t p 
r 
both persons (W) multiplied by the time input required (tm). Becker's 
example indicates this average time price must equal the original 
equilibrium price (P ). 
m 
46Note that the quantity Qe must equal one-half of the total care 
provided, given the individual demand curves and time prices. 
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47using linear demand curves where R's demand is (R = A - b * P ) 
r t 
r 
and P's demand is (Q = C - d * P ), time prices will result p t in greater p 
inequality if (Pt> Pt) and (Pt (3b-d)) - (Pt (3d-b)) > 4(A - C). 
P r p 
Given that (A> C), P's quantity demanded under a time pricing scheme 
will exceed R's quantity demanded by more than R's quantity demanded 
exceeded P's under a single money-pricing scheme. 
48The limit on total provision (Q + Q) does not apply to this 
r P example. 
49This conclusion assumes the demand for medical care is directly 
related to income. 
CHAPTER IV 
EQUITY, NEED, AND THE REGIONAL ALLOCATION 
OF NHS RESOURCES 
In Chapter III, equity, at the micro level, was defined as providing 
two individuals of equal medical need the same quantity of constant-
quality medical care. On a broader regional basis, equity in resource 
allocation would require allocating equal amounts of medical care to 
regions with equal medical need. This implies that regions with unusual 
need should be allocated resources in direct proportion to their 
relative need. 
In analyzing the issue of equity on a regional basis, this chapter 
has two objectives: first, to evaluate the actual allocation of NHS 
resource inputs among regions in accordance with indices of regional 
need, with primary attention given to non-psychiatric hospital in-patient 
services; and second, to examine regional hospital medical care output 
from the same perspective. Three indices of a region's medical need 
will be used in the evaluations. First, following the work of Cooper 
and Culyer, regional resource allocations are evaluated on the basis of 
1 . 11 . l equa per-capita a ocat1ons. Next, to extend the analysis, two 
additional measures of need are considered. These measures, the region's 
age-sex adjusted population, and its age-sex-standardized mortality 
ratio (SMR) adjusted population, represent an attempt by Britian's 
Labor Party to develop an operational index of a region's medical need. 2 
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The chapter is organized in the following way. First, a brief 
discussion of the three indices of need are presented. Second, using 
the three indices, NHS resource allocations across regions are evaluated 
for 1974 through 1977, the years following the reorganization of the 
NHS. 3 When data permits, these results are compared with Cooper and 
Culyer's 1966-1967 findings. Third, regional medical care output is 
evaluated for the same years, again, using the three indices of medical 
4 
need. 
Three Measures of a Region's Medical Need 
Three indices of a region's medical care need are used to evaluate 
NHS performance on an equity basis. The first measure of need is the 
region's crude population. The second measure is the region's crude 
population adjusted for its age-sex structure. The third measure of 
need is the region's age-sex adjusted population adjusted for the 
standardized mortality ratios (SMR) of the age-sex groups. 
Equal Per-Capita Allocations Based on 
Crude Populations 
Cooper and Culyer used this index of need to evaluate the NHS's 
performance in meeting its equity objective using 1966 and 1967 data. 5 
In their view, this measure of need represents "the equality of 
opportunity of all people to consume the health services it has been 
decided they need, in the sense of physical provision of the services 
in a geographical area. 116 While demand-side variables make achieving 
real equality of opportunity essentially unattainable in their view, 
Cooper and Culyer believed this measure to be an objective and 
reasonable yardstick for evaluating the NHS's performance. 
Equal Per-Capita Allocations Based on 
Age-Sex Adjusted Populations 
While the preceeding measure may be a preferable equity criterion 
in the sense that all persons are given equal weight, medical needs are 
not equal across the population. Since expenditures on hospital care 
account for the major part of the budget and utilization of hospital 
in-patient care varies by age and sex, adjusting the crude population 
for expected utilization rates seems justified. This index of need 
takes into account the impact on hospital utilization of the age-sex 
structure of the regions' populations. 
The age-sex adjusted population is calculated in the following 
way. First, the expected bed-days of hospital care for each age-sex 
group are computed and then summed over all age-sex groups in the 
region. Next, all regions' expected bed-days are summed to obtain a 
total for England. Third, the current total population of England is 
apportioned in proportion to the ratio of a region's expected bed days 
7 to the total expected bed days for England. 
Equal Per-Capita Allocations Based on 
Age-Sex SMR Adjusted Populations 
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The age-sex adjusted populations provided the starting point for 
developing this index of need. The age-sex categories used to determine 
utilization rates are divided into 17 International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) conditions to account for variation in bed utilization 
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rates by condition. For each ICD classification, the region's standardized 
mortality ratio (SMR) is multiplied by the age-sex weighted population 
for that condition. The results are then aggregated by region and scaled, 
as before, to match England's total population. 8 
Indices of Need and Regional Resource 
Input Allocations 
The chapter considers the distribution of NHS resources among 
regions (RHA's) on the basis of medical care need from two perspectives. 
First, NHS expenditures per capita are compared with our indices of 
medical care need. Second, actual manpower and hospital bed distributions 
among RHA's are compared with the same indices of need. 
NHS Expenditures Per-Capita 
The Office of Health Economics provides two types of hospital 
expenditure data for RHA's. 9 Net revenue expenditures refer to current 
operating expenses. Capital expenditures refer to expenditures on plant 
and equipment. Both categories of expenditure are discussed within the 
context of each measure of medical care need. 
Per-Capital Expenditures and Crude Population as an Index of RHA 
Need. Table I presents two measures of NHS performance concerning the 
regional allocation of resources using crude population as the index of 
regional need. These two measures are the coefficient of variation 
and the ratio of the highest RHA value to the lowest RHA value. The 
coefficient of variation equals the standard deviation of the RHA values 
divided by the mean of the RHA values. It is a measure of the overall 
equity of the distribution and is expressed as a percentage of the mean. 
TABLE I 
EQUITY OF NHS RHA EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA BASED ON 
THE CRUDE POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year 
Measures of Equality 1974 1975 1976 
--
Net Revenue Expenditure Per Capita 
Coefficients of Variation 
All RHA' s 16.30 16 .10 15.50 
Non-London RHA's 7.90 7.30 6.70 
London RHA's 3.90 3.40 3.40 
Ratio of High to Low 
All RHA' s 1.60 1.55 1.52 
Non-London RHA's 1.33 1. 29 1. 25 
London RHA's 1.08 1.07 1.08 
Capital Expenditure Per Capita 
Coefficients of Variation 
All RHA Is 17 .10 17.00 19.70 
Non-London RHA's 19.90 14.90 19.80 
London RHA's 4.30 24.30 21.80 
Ratio of High to Low 
All RHA' s 1.82 1.69 1.84 
Non-London RHA's 1.82 1.61 1.82 
London RHA's 1.10 1.63 1.66 
1977 
14.70 
6.70 
3.80 
1.46 
1.23 
1.08 
26.40 
25.40 
22.90 
2.47 
2.47 
1.55 
% Change 
1974-1977 
-9.81 
-15.18 
-2.56 
-8.75 
-7.51 
o.oo 
54.38 
27.63 
432.55 
35.71 
35.71 
40.90 
°' 
°' 
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Perfect equality produces a coefficient of variation of zero. The 
second measure, the high-low ratio, provides a measure of the difference 
in relative position of the "best-advantaged" RHA to the "least-
advantaged" RHA. This measure would equal one with complete equality. 
Table I presents the two measures of equity for three RHA groups: 
non-London RHA's, London RHA's, and all RHA's. First consider the 
coe.fficients of variation. Between 1974 and 1977, the coefficient of 
variation for net revenue expenditures per capita (NREPC) declined 
15.2 percent for non-London RHA's and declined only slightly for the 
London RHA's. The combined result was a 9.8 percent decrease for all 
RHA's. For capital expenditures per capita the coefficients of 
variation increased 27.6 percent for non-London RHA's and 432.6 percent 
for the London RHA's •. The combined result was a 54.4 percent increase 
for all RHA's. 
While this latter change could represent a worsening of the 
regional distribution of capital resources, it could also represent a 
correction of past regional inequity if the capital expenditures were 
made in capital-shortage regions. To find support for either case, the 
correlation coefficients between non-psychiatric hospital beds per 
1,000 population (NPB's) and capital expenditures per capita (CEPC) 
were calculated for each RHA group for 1974 through 1977. Only in 1974 
was there a statistically significant negative correlation between 
NPB's and CEPC. In that year, there was a negative 0.58 correlation 
between NPB's and CEPC for non-London RHA's, statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. Thus, the correlation analysis provides no 
strong support for the proposition that the increases in the coefficients 
of variation were the result of attempts to redress past RHA bed 
inequities through the current distribution of capital expenditures. 10 
Table I also shows that the ratios of high RHA values to low RHA 
values tell the same story. The ratios for NREPC decreased 7.5 percent 
for non-London RHA's and remained approximately constant for the London 
RHA's. The combined was an 8.8 percent decrease for all RHA's. At the 
same time, the ratios for CEPC increased 35.7 percent for non-London 
RHA's and 40.9 percent for London RHA's. 
In conclusion, the data from 1974 through 1977 indicate some 
increase in equality in terms of current operating expenditures. At 
the same time, there was an increase in inequality in terms of capital 
expenditures per capita. While these results indicate only small 
improvement overall, the data reflect a period when both net revenue 
expenditures per capita and capital expenditure per capita did not keep 
pace with inflation. Improvements in equality are much more painful in 
periods when the real budget is declining. To make a disadvantaged RHA 
better off, a more advantaged RHA must incur a larger real budget cut. 
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Per-Capita Expenditures and the Age-Sex Adjusted Population as an 
Index of RHA Need. Correlation coefficients provide a simple and useful 
way to evaluate the NHS's performance concerning the equitable regional 
distribution of resources when one uses other indices for need, e.g., 
the age-sex adjusted population ratio (ASPOPR). Table II presents the 
simple correlations between NREPC and CEPC with ASPOPR. As the table 
indicates, there is very little simple correlation between NREPC and 
ASPOPR for non-London RHA's. The coefficients are very small and not 
statistically significant. In fact, only the 1974 correlation coeffi-
cient for the London RHA's is s·tatistically significant (5 percent level) 
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and it carries the "wrong" sign. Consequently, one can conclude that the 
variation of NREPC's among RHA's does not reflect the regions' age-sex 
adjusted populations. 
TABLE II 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA NET REVENUE Ai~D 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA AND THE AGE-SEX ADJUSTED 
POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year 
Measures of Equality 1974 1975 1976 
Net Revenue Expenditure per Capita 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA's 0.24 0.25 0.28 
Non-London RHA's 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 
London RHA's -.92** -0. 77 -0.41 
Capital Expenditure per Capita 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA's -0.32 0.01 -0.04 
Non-London RHA's -0.37 -0.37 -0.21 
London RHA's 0.43 0.67 0.59 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
1977 
0.28 
0.03 
-0.52 
-0.15 
-0.11 
0.31 
To determine if any efforts to allocate net revenue expenditure 
among regions to reflect the age-sex structure of the region's 
population were masked by the necessity to fund NHS facilities and 
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personnel already in the region, the partial correlation coefficients 
between NREPC and ASPOPR were calculated for each year. These 
coefficients represent the correlation between NREPC and ASPOPR after 
controlling for (holding constant) the number of hospital beds, doctors, 
and nurses in the region. After controlling for the effects of existing 
facilities and personnel, one finds statistically significant positive 
correlations between NREPC and ASPOPR for all RHA's combined for all 
years and for non-London RHA's in 1974 and 1977. 11 These correlations 
indicate some recognition of this need measure. Again, in this period 
of declining real expenditures, this is an indication that the NHS 
may have been attempting to use an operational measure of need other 
than the crude population or was using some other allocation scheme 
which is highly correlated with the ASPOPR measure. 
Once again referring back to Table II, one finds the simple corre-
lation coefficients between CEPC and ASPOPR. No statistically 
significant simple correlations between CEPC and ASPOPR exist for any 
RHA grouping for any year. When the partial correlation coefficients 
are calculated, one finds statistically significant negative correlations 
for non-London RHA's in 1974 and 1975. From these results, one must 
conclude that the distribution of capital spending among RHA's does 
not reflect the age-sex weighted population distribution. 
Per-Capita Expenditures and the Age-Sex SMR Adjusted Population 
as an Index of Need. The analysis uses the same procedure to evaluate 
the regional distribution of expenditures in relation to the third 
index of need, the age-sex SMR adjusted population ratio (ASSMRPR). 
Table III presents the results. The findings indicate a statistically 
significant (5 percent level) simple positive correlation between NREPC 
and ASSMRPR in all years for the London RHA's. While the study finds a 
negative correlation for the non-London RHA's, only the correlation 
coefficient for 1974 was statistically significant. 
TABLE III 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA NET REVENUE AND 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA AND THE AGE-SEX SMR 
ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year 
Measures of Equality 1974 1975 1976 
Net Revenue Expenditure per Capita 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA' s 0.04 o.a4 0.06 
Non-London RHA's .55* .56* .62*. 
London RHA's -.90* -0.79 -0.42 
Capital Expenditure per Capita 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA's -.61** -0.06 0.18 
Non-London RHA's -.71** -0.33 0.07 
London RHA's 0.47 0.69 0.63 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
1977 
0.09 
.70* 
-0.54 
0.22 
0.17 
0.35 
The partial correlation coefficients used earlier to evaluate the 
ASPOPR need measure indicate a statistically significant positive 
correlation in 1974 and 1976 between NREPC and ASSMRPR. While these 
partial correlations are not as strong as the simple correlations 
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reported in Table III, they do support the proposition that the NHS 
may recognize this concept of need in its resource allocation decisions. 
I 
Capital expenditures per capita and this need index show a similar 
pattern to the other capital expenditure comparisons. In only 1974 
does one find a statistically significant simple correlation coefficient 
with the wrong sign for non-London RHA's. When existing NHS facilities 
and personnel are held constant, a statistically significant negative 
correlation occurs in 1975 for the non-London RHA' s and for all RHA 'is 
combined. In addition, a statistically significant negative partial 
correlation exists for all RHA's in 1974. Again, the distribution of 
capital spending shows no direct relationship to the RHA's age-sex 
SMR adjusted population ratios. 
NHS Resource Allocations Among RHA's 
To evaluate the distribution of NHS facilities and personnel among 
the RHA's according to medical need the analysis uses five indices. 
They are: Nurses and midwives per 100,000 population (NMW's); Hospital 
doctors below consultant grade per 100,000 population (HMS's); Hospital 
medical consultants per 100,000 population (HMC's); general medical 
practitioners per 100,000 population (GP's); and non-psychiatric 
hospital beds available per 100,000 population (NPB's). The followipg 
narrative discusses the performance of the NHS in terms of each index 
of medical need. 
i 
NHS Resource Allocations and Crude Population Used as an Index of 
RHA Need. Table IV presents the coefficients of variation and the high-
! 
low ratios for the five indices for 1974 through 1977. The coefficients 
• I 
of variation for the manpower variables indicate general improvement in 
TABLE IV 
EQUITY OF NHS RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS BASED ON THE CRUDE POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year % Change 
--------------
Measures of Equality 1974 1975 1976 1977 1974-1977 
Coefficients of Variation 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 11.00 8.80 8.50 8.70 -20.90 
Non-London RHA's 9.80 9.50 7.80 8.70 -11. 22 
London RHA's 4.00 2.90 2.70 2.70 -32.50 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 18.30 17.50 15.90 16.40 -10.38 
Non-London RHA's 10.00 9.70 8.30 9.90 -1.00 
London RHA's 16.40 14.70 13.60 13.40 -18.29 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 12.70 12.80 11.10 11.70 -7.87 
Non-London RHA's 9.10 10.40 9.60 8.90 -2.19 
London RHA's 10.30 8. 70 6.90 7.40 -28.15 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 6.70 6.40 6.50 6.00 -10.44 
Non-London RHA's 4.70 4.40 4.60 3.80 -19.14 
London RHA's 3.20 3.20 3.30 3.90 21. 87 
Non-Psyc Hospital Beds per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 9.4(E) 9.4(E) 10.10 10.l(E) NA 
Non-London RHA's 9.5(E) 9.5(E) 10. 20 10. 2(E) NA 
London RHA's 7.4(E) 7.4(E) 7.20 7.2(E) NA 
" w 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Year % Change 
Measures of Equality 1974 1975 1976 1977 1974-1977 
High RHA/Low RHA 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 1.40 1.33 1. 27 1.33 -5.00 
Non-London RHA's 1.40 1.33 1. 27 1.33 -5.00 
London RHA's 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.06 -3.63 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 1. 79 1. 74 1.65 1. 70 -5.02 
Non-London RHA's 1.35 1.33 1.27 1.32 -2.22 
London RHA's 1.47 1.38 1.36 1.36 -7.48 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 1. 62 1.68 1.54 1.52 -6.17 
Non-London RHA's 1.43 1. 49 1.40 1.36 -4.89 
London RHA's 1. 25 1.21 1.17 1.16 -7.20 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.20 -3.22 
Non-London RHA's 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.13 -4.23 
London RHA's 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.09 0.92 
Non-Psyc Hospital Beds per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 1. 34 (E) 1.35(E) 1.37 1.38(E) NA 
Non-London RHA's 1. 29(E) 1. 29(E) 1.33 1.33(E) NA 
London RHA's 1.16(E) 1.16(E) 1.16 l.16(E) NA 
. 
Note: E = Estimated; NA= Not Available. 
-...J 
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per-capita equality in all years. For nurses and midwives (NMW's), the 
data show decreases of 11.2 percent for non-London RHA's and 32.5 percent 
for London RHA's. For hospital doctors below consultant grade (HMS's), 
the decrease of one percent for non-London RHA's is small while the 
decrease of 18.3 percent for the London RHA's is much larger, possible 
reflecting the relative attractiveness of the London RHA's to hospital 
doctors. This same pattern of improvement in the equality of the 
distribution occurs for hospital medical consultants (HMC's), with the 
coefficient of variation declining 2.2 percent for non-London RHA's and 
28.2 percent for London RHA's. For general medical practitioners (GP's), 
the data indicate an improvement of 19.1 percent for non-London RHA's 
but an increase in the coefficient of variation of 21.9 percent for the 
London RHA's. In this latter case, the greatest increase in GP's 
occurred in the London RHA with the highest GP to population ratio, 
North West Thames. 
South West Thames experienced the largest percentage increases in 
HMS's and HMC's during the same period. The increases in HMS's and 
HMC's possibly represent corrections for shortages since the RHA ranked 
last among London RHA's in these categories in 1974. But the changes 
still left South West Thames in last place, although the RHA improved 
its rank from third to second in terms of GP's. 
Cooper and Culyer provided information on three of the above 
indices for 1966-1967. 12 While the reorganization of the NHS in 1974 
slightly altered the boundaries, making "strict comparisons" between 
1966-1967 and the 1974-1977 period impossible, a comparison between 
Cooper and Culyers' findings and the data for 1974-1977 provides an 
indication of NHS improvement in meeting this equity objective over time. 13 
Looking at our indices slightly differently, Cooper and Culyer found a 
coefficient of variation of 16.8 percent for population per hospital 
medical consultant for non-London RHA's while the high-low ratio was 
2.02. 14 When HMC's are converted to population-doctor ratios, the 
coefficient of variation for non-London RHA's was 10.4 percent in 1974 
and 9.5 percent in 1977. At the same time, the high-low ratios were 
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1.43 and 1.36 respectively~ This comparison suggests significant improve-
ment over time in the' equity of the geographical distribution of HMC's. 
While one cannot attribute all of the change to an improvement in equity, 
it would also be difficult to attribute changes of this magnitude to the 
boundary changes alone. 
For hospital doctors below consultant, Cooper and Culyer report a 
coefficient of variation of 16.86 percent for non-London RHA's. They 
also report high-low ratios of 1.83 for non-London RHA's and 2.69 for 
all RHA's. 15 After converting HMS's to population-doctor ratios, one 
finds a coefficient of variation of 9.6 percent in 1974, and 9.5 percent 
in 1977 for non-London RHA's. At the same time, the high-low ratio for 
non-London RHA's was 1.35 and 1.32 respectively while equalling 1.79 and 
1.70 for all RHA's. Again, these data show significant improvements in 
equity using these measures. 
A comparison of Cooper and Culyers' findings to data for 1976, the 
only year for which detailed RHA bed data were available, indicates no 
improvement in the equity of the distribution of hospital beds among 
regions. In 1966-1967, the coefficient of variation for non-London RHA's 
was essentially the same, 11.0 percent. The comparison of high to low 
values remains unchanged. The ratio for non-London RHA's in 1966-1967 
was 1.43 and also 1.43 in 1976. 16 However, some improvement did occur 
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in this measure for all RHA's combined, declining from 1.82 in 1966/1967 
to 1.59 in 1976. The change suggests that bed reductions in the NHS 
occurred in the regions with the most beds. But since the coefficients 
of variation changed little, there is no indication that the bed reduc-
tions were systematic attempts to equalize the regional bed distribution 
. b . 17 on a per capita asis. 
NHS Resource Allocations and Age-Sex Adjusted Populations Used as 
an Index of Need. Table V presents the simple correlations between the 
five resource indices and the age-sex adjusted population ratios 
(ASPOPR's) for the RHA's for 1974 through 1977. Positive statistically 
significant correlations exist for at least one RHA grouping for NMW's 
and GP's. Statistically significant negative correlations exist for 
HMS's for the London RHA's. HMC's and NPB's demonstrate no statistically 
significant correlations with ASPOPR, although the correlation coeffi-
cients between HMC's and ASPOPR are fairly large and negative for the 
London RHA's. The correlations between NPB's and ASPOPR are small, 
indicating that the distribution of NPB's is almost completely 
18 independent of the RHA's populations' age-sex structures. In conclu-
sion, only the allocation of GP's among non-London RHA's reflects the 
age-sex need measure for all years, while the distribution of NMW's 
· among the London RHA's does so only for 1977. No other resource index 
has the requisite positive correlation. 
Table VI presents the correlations between the manpower indices 
and ASPOPR, controlling for the number of hospital beds in the region. 19 
Generally, the distribution of GP's is the only index to demonstrate 
a statistically significant positive correlation, with non-London RHA's 
demonstrating a generally large and increasing correlation with ASPOPR 
TABLE V 
NHS RESOURCE INPUT ALLOCATIONS AND THE AGE-SEX ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Correlation Coefficients 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Non-Psyc Hospital Beds per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
1974 
0.16 
0.03 
-.82* 
-0.07 
-0.32 
-.83* 
0.04 
-0.11 
-0.64 
.48** 
. 72*** 
-.90* 
.38*(E) 
.38(E) 
.19(E) 
Year 
1975 
0.20 
0.05 
0.11 
-0.14 
0.25 
-.87* 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.72 
.48** 
.74*** 
-.86* 
.38(E) 
.38(E) 
.19(E) 
Note: E =estimated;*= statistically significant at the 10 percent level;**= 
significant at the 5 percent level;***= statistically significant at the 
1976 1977 
0.18 0.23 
-0.12 -0.05 
0.36 .90** 
-0.12 -0.10 
0.33 -0.44 
-.90** -.84* 
0.12 0.13 
0.03 0.02 
-0.71 -0.74 
.56** .48** 
.88*** .83*** 
-.81* -0.78 
.37* .37*(E) 
0.34 .34(E) 
0.19 .19(E) 
statistically 
1 percent level. 
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TABLE VI 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NHS RHA MANPOWER RESOURCE INPUTS AND THE AGE-SEX ADJUSTED 
POPULATION NEED MEASURE (CONTROLLING FOR RHA PSYCHIATRIC 
AND NON-PSYCHIATRIC BEDS) 
Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
1974 
-0.25 
-0.28 
-0.86 
-0.20 
-0.35 
-0.85 
-0.01 
0.10 
-0. 72 
0.36 
.65*** 
-1.00** 
Year 
1975 1976 
-0.26 -0.29 
-0.17 -.51* 
0.12 0.37 
-0.24 -0.21 
-0.39 -0.28 
-0.90 -0.88 
-0.03 0.07 
0.19 0.35 
-0.79 -0.77 
0.36 .46* 
.67** .85*** 
-1.00** -.99** 
1977 
-0.03 
-0.24 
0.91 
-0.25 
-0.41 
-0.86 
0.07 
0.43 
-0.80 
0.37 
.81*** 
-.99** 
-...J 
I.O 
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over the period. However, at the same time, the London RHA's showed an 
1 . . 11 . . f i · 1 · 20 even arger statistica y signi cant negative corre ation. 
NHS Resource Allocations and the Age-Sex SMR. Adjusted Populations 
Used as an Index of Need. Table VII presents the simple correlation 
coefficients between the resource indices and the age-sex SMR adjusted 
population ratios (ASSMRPR's). These correlations tell a different story. 
NMW's exhibit the desired statistically significant positive correlations 
with this need index for all years in at least one RHA grouping. For 
non-London RHA's. the correlations are statistically significant in all 
years. In 1977, the London RHA's also exhibit a large statistically 
significant correlation. 
Hospital doctors, at consultant grade and below (HMS's), have either 
positive coefficients that are not statistically significant or negative 
coefficients which are statistically significant. The coefficients for 
the non-London RHA's are generally small. At the same time, the 
coefficients for the London RHA's are large and negative. 
While GP's exhibited a strong positive correlation with the ASPOPR 
need measure for non-London RHA's, there is essentially no correlation 
between GP's and the ASSMRPR need measure. This seems contradictory in 
light of the correspondence in the results between the two need measures 
for the London RHA's. But a check of the correlations between these 
two need measures shows a .48 correlation for non-London RHA's and a 
.998 correlation for the London RHA's. This explains away the 
apparently contradictory results. 
The correlation between NPB's and ASSMRPR's is encouraging for the 
non-London RHA's. While actual data were available for 1976 only, a 
strong statistically significant positive correlation exists. 21 This 
TABLE VII 
NHS RHA RESOURCE INPUT ALLOCATIONS AND THE AGE-SEX SMR ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Correlation Coefficients 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Non-Psyc Hospital Beds per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
1974 
0.22 
.54* 
-0.79 
-0.18 
0.17 
-.86* 
-0.27 
-0 .17 
-0.66 
-0.16 
0.02 
-.91* 
.44*(E) 
.70**(E) 
.28(E) 
Year 
1975 
.52** 
.70** 
0 .15 
-0.08 
-0.38 
-.86* 
-0.21 
-0.07 
-0.74 
-0 .16 
0.02 
-.87* 
.44*(E) 
.7l**(E) 
.28(E) 
1976 1977 
.37* .50** 
~62** .68** 
0.41 .93** 
-0.06 -0.13 
-0.35 0.23 
-.88* -.87* 
-0 .15 -0 .15 
0.02 0.05 
-0.74 -0.77 
-0.05 -0.15 
0.21 0.06 
-.83* -.80* 
.45* .45*(E) 
. 72*** • 72***(E) 
0.29 .29(E) 
Note: E =estimated;*= statistically significant at the 10 percent level;**= statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level;***= statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
(X) 
I-' 
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indicates at least some direct correlation between this need measure and 
the historical distribution of hospital beds. Unfortunately, there is no 
large positive correlation between NPB's and ASSMRPR's for the London 
RHA's. 
Table VIII presents the partial correlation coefficients for the 
manpower indices and ASSMRPR, after holding constant non-psychiatric 
and psychiatric hospital beds in the RHA. 22 No statistically significant 
positive correlations exist. Only in the case of the non-London RHA's 
was a large positive coefficient (.94) found for NMW's. 
The correlations for both HMS's and HMC's are large and negative 
for the London RHA's while the non-London RHA's exhibit smaller negative 
correlations. One possible explanation for the lack of correlation is 
that the allocation of NHS hospital doctors among regions is mainly a 
function of the staffing of hospital beds and not medical need as measured 
by ASSMRPR. For all RHA's combined, the positive statistically signifi-
cant (5 percent level) simple correlation of .50 or better which exists 
between hospital doctors (HMC's and HMS's) and NPB's bears this propo-
sition out. 
The partial correlation coefficients for GP's and ASSMRPR's present 
the same patterns observed earlier with the ASPOPR need measure. After 
controlling for both types of hospital beds in the RHA's, there is no 
statistically significant correlation between GP's and ASSMRPR for the 
non-London RHA's while a negative 1.00 correlation, statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, exists for the London RHA's. These 
results agree with the findings concerning the partial correlations of 
GP's with ASPOPR. Since GP's and ASPOPR are highly positively correlated 
for the non-London RHA's but ASPOPR and ASSMRPR are not higher 
TABLE VIII 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN NHS RHA MANPOWER RESOURCE INPUTS AND 
THE AGE-SEX SMR ADJUSTED POPULATION- NEED MEASURE (CONTROLLING 
FOR PSYCHIATRIC AND NON-PSYCHIATRIC BEDS) 
Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Nurses and Midwives per 100,000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Medical Staff per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Hospital Med Consultants per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
General Practitioners per 100,000 Population 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
* 
1974 
-.58** 
-0.31 
-0.83 
-.54** 
-0.12 
-0.88 
-.68*** 
-0.50 
-0.76 
-.44* 
...:.O .01 
-1.00** 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Year 
1975 
0.23 
0.23 
0.18 
-.56** 
-0.06 
-0.92 
-.67*** 
-0.47 
-0.82 
-.44* 
-0.01 
-1.00** 
1976 
-0.30 
-0.11 
0.43 
-.52** 
-0.10 
-0.91 
-.59** 
-0.30 
-0.80 
-0.34 
0.22 
-1.00** 
1977 
0 .15 
0.18 
0.94 
-.54** 
-0.03 
-0.89 
-.58** 
-0 .18 
-0.84 
-.42* 
0.16 
-1.00** 
00 
L,.J 
positively correlated with each other for this RHA sub-group, the high 
correlation of GP's with ASPOPR precludes its correlation with ASSMRPR. 
On the other hand, ASPOPR and ASSMRPR were highly positively correlated 
for the London RHA's, so correlation with one need measure would ensure 
correlation with the other. 
In conclusion, the comparisons show the NHS improved the equality 
of the distribution of manpower among the RHA's, based on the crude 
population need measure. Furthermore, for the two manpower indices 
compared to Cooper and Culyers' study of 1966-1967 data, the 1974-1977 
distributions of HMC's and HMS's represented significant improvements 
over the distributions existing in 1966-1967. The only index showing 
no improvement was the regional distribution of non-psychiatric 
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hospital beds. In general, then, the NHS appears to have made an effort 
to improve the regional equity of the distribution of these manpower 
resources. But, as noted, regional per capita inequities still remain. 
However, evaluation of the 1974-1977 regional distribution of NHS 
resources with respect to the alternative need measures finds mixed 
results at best. The desired large, statistically significant 
positive correlations occur in non-London RHA's for NMW's and GP's 
when ASPOPR is used as an index of need. In the London RHA's, the 
correlation for NMW's also show the desired result for this need index. 
However, at the same time, HMS's and GP's exhibit large statistically 
significant negative correlations for the London regions. The other 
indices, HMC's, HMS's and NPB's, did not possess large statistically 
significant correlations. 
When ASSMRPR is used as the measure of regional medical care need, 
the regional distributions of NMW's and NPB's in the non-London RHA's 
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exhibit the desired results. For the London RHA's, only NMW's in 1977 
do so. At the same time, however, large statistically significant 
negative correlations occur for HMC's and GP's for the London RHA's. 
Also, the distribution of HMC's among all RHA's combined possess a large 
statistically significant negative correlation with ASSMRPR for 1974 and 
1975. 
One must conclude from these findings that, overall, the distribu-
tions of NHS resources among RHA's show no systematic relation to either 
the age-sex adjusted or age-sex SMR adjusted_population ratios of the 
RHA's. This is not a devastating criticism of past NHS policy, in and 
of itself, for these measures of need were developed for future alloca-
tions (post 1977). But if these indices represent valid measures of 
past and current regional need, they point out the inadequacy of the past 
methods used to allocate NHS resources among the various geographic 
regions. 
Indices of Need and Regional Output 
After evaluating the distribution of NHS resource inputs among 
geographic regions, the final objective of this chapter is to evaluate 
the distribution of the RHA' s hospital medical care outputs with respect 
to the same indices of need. Correlations of RHA resource inputs with 
the measures of need provide one means of evaluating the NHS's intent 
of achieving geographic equity. Alternatively, correlations of RHA 
hospital medical care outputs with need provide a more direct measure 
of NHS performance at the RHA level in actually achieving equality. 
The analysis uses two indices of RHA hospital medical care output. 
The first index, which Cooper and Culyer also used in their study, is 
the number of all hospital discharges and deaths per 1000 population 
(QHDDP). The second index is the number of cases treated per available 
bed in non-psychiatric hospitals (QHCB). The following narrative 
presents the findings of the analysis, discussing each index within the 
context of each measure of need. 
RHA Output and the Crude Population 
Need Measure 
Table IX presents the coefficients of variation and the high-low 
ratios for QHDDP and QHCB. The coefficients of variation for QHDDP 
decreased 14.9 percent between 1974 and 1977 for the non-London RHA's 
but increased 18.3 percent for the London RHA's during the same period. 
The combined effect was a decrease in the coefficients of variation for 
all RHA's of 5.6 percent. 
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Decreases in the coefficients of variation were expected for both 
RHA groups since the regional variation of NHS manpower inputs generally 
decreased during this period. That made the increase for the London 
RHA's unexpected. From 1974 through 1977, the coefficients of variation 
decreased for the nurse, hospital doctor, and hospital medical consultant 
manpower categories for both the non-London RHA's and the London RHA's. 
In addition, the decreases in the coefficients of variation for the 
London RHA's were much l~rger than their non-London counterparts for 
nurses, hospital doctors, and consultants, while GP's, as noted earlier, 
experienced a 21.9 percent increase. At the same time, manpower to 
population ratios increased in all manpower categories for both 
non-London and London RHA's. Why, then did the coefficients of variation 
for QHDDP and QHCB increase for the London RHA's? The answer appears to 
TABLE IX 
EQUITY OF NHS RHA OUTPUT PER 1000 POPULATION AND PER BED 
BASED ON THE CRUDE POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year 
Measures of Output Equality 1974 _____ 1975 1976 
RHA Hospital Cischarges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
Coefficients of Variation 
All RHA's 7.20 7 .10 7.30 
Non-London RHA's 7.40 7.00 7.20 
London RHA's 6.00 5.40 5.90 
Ratio of High to Low 
All RHA Is 1. 31 1.28 1.30 
Non-London RHA's 1.28 1.23 1. 24 
London RHA's 1.15 1.14 1.15 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
Coefficients of Variation 
All RHA' s 8.80 8.40 8.20 
Non-London RHA's 9.60 9.30 9.20 
London RHA's 4.80 5.20 4.50 
Ratio of High to Low 
All RHA Is 1.39 1. 41 1.41 
Non-London RHA's 1.39 1.41 1.41 
London RHA's 1.10 1.12 1.10 
1977 
6.80 
6.30 
7 .10 
1.23 
1. 22 
1.17 
8 .10 
8.90 
6.00 
1.39 
1.39 
1.15 
% Change 
1974-1977 
-5.55 
-14.86 
18.33 
-6.10 
-4.68 
1. 73 
-7.95 
-7.29 
25.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.54 
00 
-....I 
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lie with the explanation of the large relative increase in output for one 
London RHA. The data indicate that South East Thames experienced a 
larger relative increase in both output measures than the other London 
RHA's. QHDDP increased 8.28 percent while QHCB increased 14.2 percent, 
compared with 3.1 percent and 11.2 percent for the next closest RHA. In 
addition, North West Thames and South West Thames exhibited very small 
relative increases in QHDDP during the period. 
When one compares these coefficients of variation with the 9.95 
percent reported for QHDDP by Cooper and Culyer for 1966-1967 for non-
London RHA's, one finds an improvement of 36.7 percent by 1977. 23 
The high-low ratio decreased from 1.41 to 1.22, a 13.5 percent decrease, 
d i h . . 24 ur ng tis same time span. Both measures, then, indicate improvements 
in the geographic distributions of hospital output for the non-London 
RHA's using crude population as the measure of need. 
While Cooper and Culyer did not report the number of cases treated 
per bed in non-psychiatric hospitals in 1966-1967, this alternative 
measure of RHA output (QHCB) exhibits smaller but similar changes to 
QHDDP over the 1974 to 1977 period. The coefficients of variation for 
QHCB decreased 7.3 percent for non-London RHA's during the period while 
increasing 25.0 percent for the London RHA's. At the same time the 
high-low ratios for the non-London RHA's remained essentially constant 
and increased 4.6 percent for the London RHA's. For all RHA's combined, 
the coefficients of variation decreased 8.0 percent and the high-low 
ratios remained approximately constant. 
RHA Output and the Age-Sex Adjusted 
Bopulation Need Measure 
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Table X provides the simple correlation coefficients between the 
RHA output indices and ASPOPR. As the table indicates, the correlations 
are generally small and not statistically significant. Only for the 
London RHA's in 1974 and 1977 does one find somewhat larger coefficients. 
In 1974, the coefficient is -0.52, while the coefficient in 1977 is 0.44. 
While this change represents a definite improvement, neither coefficient 
is statistically significant. 
To examine the possibility that output correlations with this need 
index may be masked by variations in case-mix or resource input 
allocations among RHA's, partial correlations for the output indices and 
ASPOPR were calculated. The results are presented in Table XI on the 
following page. When case-mix only is held constant, all RHA's combined 
exhibit positive and statistically significant coefficients of .51 or 
greater for all years for QHDDP and ASPOPR. While the coefficients 
for the non-London subgroup were similar in size, they were not 
statistically significant. The partial correlation coefficients 
between QHCB and ASPOPR were small, negative, and not statistically 
significant. 
When averagelengthsof stay as well as case mix are held constant, 
the partial correlation coefficients between QHDDP and ASPOPR increase 
in size in all years for non-London RHA's and all RHA's combined. In 
addition, the partial correlation coefficients for 1974 and 1977 for 
the non-London RHA's are statistically significant. Additionally 
controlling for average length of stay produces large positive 
TABLE X 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA HOSPITAL DISCHARGES AND 
DEATHS PER 1000 POPULATION AND RHA NON-PSYCHIATRIC CASES 
TREATED PER AVAILABLE BED AND THE AGE-SEX 
ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Year 
Measures of Output Equality 1974 1975 1976 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA' s -0.06 0.04 0.05 
Non-London RHA's -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 
London RHA's -0.52 -0.31 0.09 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA's 0.06 0 .11 0 .11 
Non-London RHA's 0.23 0.21 0.23 
London RHA's -0.09 0 .18 -0.29 
1977 
0.13 
0.03 
-0.08 
0.20 
0.23 
0.44 
"° 0 
TABLE XI 
PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA HOSPITAL DISCHARGES AND 
DEATHS PER 1000 POPULATION AND RHA NON-PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL 
CASES TREATED PER BED AND THE AGE-SEX 
ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Measures of Output Equality 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Case Mix 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Case Mix and Average Lengths of Stay 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
1974 
.57* 
0.60 
N 
-0.29 
-0.19 
N 
.73** 
.74* 
N 
0.41 
0.51 
N 
1975 
.51* 
0.37 
N 
-0 .19 
-0.13 
N 
.59** 
0.46 
N 
0.47 
0.45 
N 
Year 
1976 
.58** 
0.52 
N 
-0.35 
-0.37 
N 
.67** 
0.65 
N 
0.44 
0.46 
N 
1977 
.62** 
0.58 
N 
-0.32 
-0.18 
N 
.72** 
, 73* 
N 
0.07 
0.17 
N 
\0 
...... 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
Measures of Output Equality 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Resource Inputs 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA Is 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
1974 
0.11 
-0.04 
N 
0 .12 
0.44 
N 
1975 
0.05 
0.00 
N 
0.05 
0.13 
N 
Year 
1976 
0.17 
-0.50 
N 
-0.01 
-0.53 
N 
Note: N = figure cannot be calculated due to insufficient degrees of freedom;*= statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level;**=- statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
1977 
.65** 
0.38 
N 
0.46 
0.15 
N 
I.O 
N 
coefficients for QHCB and ASPOPR but these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. 
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Controlling for RHA resource input allocations, by holding constant 
NMW's, HMS's, NPB's, and GP's, results in a positive statistically 
significant partial correlation between QHDDP and ASPOPR in 1977. A 
partial correlation coefficient of 0.65 results. But while a similar 
pattern emerges between QHCB and ASPOPR, the coefficient for 1977 is 
0.46 and not statistically significant. 
RHA Output and the Age-Sex SMR Adjusted 
Population Need Measure 
Table XII provides the simple correlation coefficients between the 
same RHA output indices and ASSMRPR. When this index of need is used, 
one finds a positive statistically significant simple correlation of 
0.56 between QHDDP and ASSMRPR in 1977 for the non-London RHA's. At 
the same time, however, the simple correlation between QHCB and ASSMRPR 
is -0.54 and also statistically significant. The respective correlations 
for the London RHA's are not statistically significant. Only in 1977 
does one find a positive coefficient of any size. 
To further analyze the results to again determine if any important 
relationships are masked by variations in case severity or resource 
input allocations, partial correlation coefficients were computed. 
Table XIII presents the findings. First, controlling for variations in 
case mix only, positive coefficients are found between QHDDP and ASSMRPR 
in all years. At the same time, statistically significant negative 
coefficients between QHCB and ASSMRPR result for all RHA's combined 
from 1974 through 1976, while the coefficients for the non-London RHA 
group are negative, small, and not statistically significant. 
TABLE XII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA HOSPITAL DISCHARGES AND 
DEATHS PER 1000 POPULATION AND RHA NON-PSYCHIATRIC CASES 
TREATED PER AVAILABLE BED AND THE AGE-SEX 
SMR ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Measures of Output Equality 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA's 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
Correlation Coefficients 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
1974 
0 .15 
0.35 
-0.53 
-.47** 
-.57** 
-0.08 
1975 
0.22 
0.42 
-0.31 
-.45* 
-.57** 
0 .19 
Year 
1976 
0.21 
0.41 
-0.09 
-.46** 
-.56** 
-0.28 
1977 
0.33 
.56** 
-0.10 
-.39* 
-.54* 
0.43 
\.0 
.p.. 
TABLE XIII 
PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RHA HOSPITAL DISCHARGES AND 
DEATHS PER 1000 POPULATION AND RHA NON-PSYCHIATRIC CASES 
TREATED PER AVAILABLE BED AND THE AGE-SEX SMR 
ADJUSTED POPULATION NEED MEASURE 
Measures of Output Equality 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Case Mix 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Case Mix and Average Lengths of Stay 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA' s 
Non-London RHA's 
London RHA's 
1974 
0 .16 
0.52 
N 
-.56* 
-0 .15 
N 
0.26 
0.65 
N 
-0.27 
0.61 
N 
1975 
0.04 
0.37 
N 
-.48* 
-0 .19 
N 
0.06 
0.49 
N 
-0 .16 
0.50 
N 
Year 
1976 
0.01 
0.53 
N 
-.54* 
-0.33 
N 
-0.04 
.69* 
N 
-0.22 
.69* 
N 
1977 
0.30 
0.59 
N 
-0.40 
-0.03 
N 
0.35 
• 77* 
N 
-0. 19 
0.57 
N 
\.0 
\JI 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Year 
Measures of Output Equality 1974 1975 1976 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Controlling 
for RHA Resource Inputs 
RHA Hospital Discharges and Deaths per 1000 Population 
All RHA 's 0.33 0.29 0.26 
Non-London RHA's -0.65 0.16 -0.18 
London RHA's N N N 
RHA Non-Psychiatric Cases Treated per Available Bed 
All RHA's -0.02 0.09 0.00 
Non-London RHA's -0.42 0.26 -0.21 
London RHA's N N N 
Note: N = figure cannot be calculated due to insufficient degrees of freedom;*= statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level;**= statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
1977 
.62** 
0.59 
N 
0.26 
0.27 
N 
I.O 
°' 
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When average length of stay as well as case mix is controlled for, 
the positive coefficients for the non-London RHA's between QHDDP and 
ASSMRPR increase in size and become statistically significant in 1976 
and 1977. Furthermore, the coefficients for QHCB and ASSMRPR for this 
RHA subgroup become positive and increase considerably in absolute size. 
In 1976, the partial correlation coefficient of 0.69 is statistically 
significant. 
If the variation of resource input allocations among RHA's are 
controlled for, a positive, statistically significant partial correlation 
results between QHDDP and ASSMRPR for all RHA's combined in 1977. 
However, the coefficient for the non-London RHA's is no longer 
statistically significant. At the same time, the partial correlations 
between QHCB and ASSMRPR are not statistically significant and demon-
strate no clear trend. 
In conclusion, the two RHA output indices demonstrate general 
improvements in the equality of provision of health care for the non-
London RHA's, depending upon the need measure used. When need is 
measured by the RHA's crude population, the decline in the coefficients 
of variation for both output indices show this improvement. When need 
is measured by the regions' age-sex adjusted population ratios, the 
simple correlation coefficients do not reflect the desired improvement. 
But when case severity is controlled for by holding case mix and average 
length of stay constant, the non-London RHA's have statistically 
significant positive correlations between QHDDP and ASPOPR in 1974 and 
1977. When the age-sex SMR adjusted population ratio is used to 
measure RHA need and case severity is controlled for, statistically 
significant partial correlations with QHDDP of 0.69 and 0.77 result 
in 1976 and 1977. Additionally, the partial correlation of 0.69 with 
QHCB is also. statistically significant. 
Controlling for variations in resource inputs among RHA's does 
result in a statistically significant partial correlation with QHDDP 
and the two adjusted population need measures for all RHA's in 1977. 
But the procedure provides no statistically significant coefficients 
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for the non-London RHA's. This result should not be entirely unexpected 
since the distribution of hospital doctors among the non-London RHA's 
showed little improvement in terms of equality. 
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Office of Health Economics, ORE Compendium of Health Statistics, 3rd 
Edition (Luton, 1979), Ch. 1, pp. 18-19; Ch. 2, p. 14; Ch. 3, pp. 8-9, 
13, 25-28; and Ch. 4, p. 8. 
4While demand also plays an important role in the NHS system which 
relies on time prices, consideration of the demand side will be postponed 
to the next chapter. 
5 Cooper and Culyer, pp. 208-214. 
6rbid., p. 208. 
7 Department of Health and Social Security, 1976, pp. 97-98. 
8rbid., p. 100. 
9office of Health Economics, pp. 18-19. 
10During the period from 1974 through 1977, the medical care price 
index increased 67.7 percent, based on data supplied by the Office of 
Health Economics, p. 4. During the same period, capital spending per 
capita for non-London RHA's increased 24.1 percent while increasing 3.6 
percent for London RHA.s Consequently, since real expenditures per 
capita are declining, it would be difficult to redress regional 
inequities without neglecting legitimate needs elsewhere. For example, 
Trent, a RHA which ranked very low in terms of NPBP, received a 59.3 
percent increase in CEPC during this period. On the other hand, Mersey, 
which ranked highest among non-London RHA's in terms of NPBP, received 
a 57.7 percent increase during the same period. 
11comparable partial correlations for the four London RHA's could 
not be calculated because the number of observations was less than the 
five variables held constant. 
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12M. H. Cooper and A. J. Culyer, "Equity in the NHS: Intensions, 
Performance and Problems in Evaluation," in The Economics of Medica~ 
Care, M. M. Hauser (ed.) (London, 1972), p. 56. 
13 Ruth Levitt, The Reorganized National Health Service (London, 
1976), pp. 22-51. 
14 Cooper and Culyer, 1972, p. 55. 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
17oepartment of Health and Social Security, 1977, pp. 84-86. 'ljo 
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make the 1974-1977 years comparable to Cooper 
beds per 1000 population, non-psychiatric and 
population were combined and the coefficients 
and Culyer' s measure, I total 
psychiatric beds per 1000 
of variation computed. 
18one would not necessarily expect any correlation since the distri-
bution of hospital beds was "inherited" by the NHS and has remained 
largely unchanged. The only way the ~urrent age-sex distribution would 
match the historical distribution of hospital beds would be for the 
distributions of both to not have changed significantly over time an!d for 
the original distribution of beds to reflect the need for hospital beds 
originating from this age-sex structure. 
19The partial correlation coefficient can be used to locate reLa-
tionships where none appear to exist. This is appropriate if there 
exists a possibility that some variable or variables act to hide or 
suppress the relationship. For example, since the manpower indices 
are highly correlated with hospital beds, but hospital beds are not highly 
correlated with ASPOPR, then any attempt to reallocate manpower reso~rces 
by ASPOPR may not show up. For more information on partial correlation 
coefficients, see Robert Pindyck and Daniel Rubinfeld, Econometric , 
Models and Economic Forecasts, 2nd Edition (New York, 1981), pp. 91-94. 
20-The London RHA partial correlations are computed holding only 
non-psychiatric hospital beds constant due to the limited number of 
observations. 
21The results for the other years represent bed to population ratios 
estimated using the assumption that the RHA bed shares in 1976 were 
equal to the bed shares for the other years. Total beds in each of j 
these years were allocated among the RHA's on this basis. 
22The closest partial correlation which could be calculated for the 
London RHA's holds only non-psychiatric hospital beds constant. With 
only four London RHA's, the partial correlation holding both types of 
beds constant could not be calculated. 
23 Cooper and Culyer, 1972, p. 55. 
24Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR, 
AND HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY 
This chapter presents the second and third areas of empirical 
investigation. The second area of investigation examines the relative 
efficiency of the RHA's hospital sectors and attempts to find explana-
tions for these efficiency differences. The third area of investigation 
examines how hospital doctor behavior affects relative regional efficiency 
through the impact on average length of stay. 
To examine relative regional efficiency, the analysis uses linear 
programming techniques to estimate an RHA hospital sector production 
function. The estimated production function is then used to create 
indices of relative efficiency. These indices are then to be used to 
determine causes for the efficiency differences among the RHA's. 
The chapter organizes the presentation into two major sections. 
The first section discusses the linear programming estimation procedure. 
After doing so, a discussion of the data follows. The estimated 
production functions are then presented. Last, the efficiency indices 
created from these production function estimates are discussed within 
the context of the RHA medical care need measures. 
The second section uses the efficiency indices to determine 
possible causes for relative regional efficiency differences. Medical 
care demand variables are examined in an excess demand framework. The 
101 
102 
study hypothesizes that variations in excess demand will explain vari-
ations in RHA hospital sector efficiency. As part of this analysis, 
this section seeks to determine if utility maximizing behavior of 
hospital doctors reduces hospital sector response to excess demand 
pressure. 
RHA Hospital Sector Production Functions 
and Relative Efficiency 
The concept of technical efficiency in economics refers to producing 
the maximum possible output from a given set of inputs. 1 Following 
Wilson and Jadlow and others, this study employs linear programming to 
estimate the parameters of an RHA hospital sector production function. 2 
As Wilson and Hadlow note, this approach is desirable because it 
constrains all observations to lie either on or below the estimated 
d . f . 3 pro uction sur ace. 
After choosing the estimation technique, one must choose the type 
of production surface to estimate. Basically, there are two choices and 
4 Forsund, Lovell, and Schmidt attribute both to Farrell. The first 
surface is called a deterministic non-parametric frontier and the 
second a deterministic parametric frontier. Forsund et al. note the 
former has the advantage of not imposing a functional form, such as that 
of the Cobb-Douglas function, on the data. But it has the disadvantage 
of assuming constant returns to scale. The latter has the advantages of 
expressing the frontier in a simple mathematical form, e.g., the Cobb-
Douglas form, and the ability to handle non-constant returns to scale. 
But it has the disadvantages of imposing a possibly incorrect form on 
the production surface and limiting the number of observations that can 
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lie on the production surface to the number of parameters estimated. 
Additionally, both approaches suffer from the disadvantages of being 
I 
very sensitive to extreme observations and the fact that the coefficient 
I 
5 
estimates have no statistical properties for which they can be evaluated. 
Due to the theoretical and computational problems of the non-
parametric approach, Forsund et al. note that this approach has "won 
6 few adherents." Consequently, this study follows the path of othets 
by choosing the parametric approach and using a Cobb-Douglas production 
f . 7 unction. In addition, like Timmer, once the deterministic frontier 
is estimated, the efficient observations are discarded, one at a time 
in this case, to determine if the estimated coefficients are affected 
by outliers. 8 
The Data and Estimated Production Functions 
Hospital bed data were available on a regional basis for 1976 but 
were needed for 1974, 1974, 1975, and 1977. To provide bed data for 
the missing years, it was necessary to allocate yearly total beds for 
England to the regions, based on the assumption that RHA bed shares 
remained constant. This assumption is supported by the finding in I 
Chapter IV that the coefficients of variation for hospital beds had! 
9 
not changed much from Cooper and Culyer's study. 
The Office of Health Economics provided RHA data on nurses andi 
midwives (NMW), hospital medical staff (doctors below consultant grAde) 
(HMS), and hospital medical consultants (HMC). 10 I But each of these 
manpower categories combines NHS activities in addition to non-psychiatric 
hospital care. Consequently, it was necessary to separate non-psycJiatric 
hospital manpower from this total. To do so, the study uses average 
11 
staff ratios per bed. 
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Two measures of each RHA's non-psychiatric hospital sector output 
are calculated. The first measure is total non-psychiatric cases 
treated. The second measure is non-psychiatric cases treated, weighted 
by an index of the relative cost of each broad case type and a costl 
index converting hospital outpatient visits to weighted case equivalents. 
Each measure was used to estimate an alternative form of the Cobb- , 
Douglas production function. 12 
! 
The Office of Health Economics provided data on non-psychiatrie 
! 
13 
cases treated per available bed. To obtain total non-psychiatric 
cases treated, cases treated per bed were multiplied by the RHA 
non-psychiatric bed stock. 
The second output measure is based on the first. To capture tne 
multi-product nature of the hospital sector's outputs, the cases are 
weighted by an index based on national average cost per case. Data 1 on 
four broad case types were available for each year. 14 
The form of the Cobb-Douglas production function used to estim1te 
unweighted non-psychiatric cases has the following functional form: 
Ln(Q) 2. Ln(A) + Bl Ln(NMW) + B2 Ln(HMS + HMC) + B3 Ln(BEDS) + 1 
t (YEAR)+ L (LONDON)+ m (CASEMIX - MEDICAL)+ (1) 
s (CASEMIX - SURGERY). 
In addition to variables discussed in the preceding section, a time i 
I 
trend variable (YEAR), two casemix variables (MEDICAL and SURGERY), 
and a dummy variable for London (LONDON) are added. The exponential 
time trend variable provides a simple control for technical progress 
and implies technology is neutral in its effect on the productivity lof 
16 
capital and labor. The casemix variables are also entered in 
! 
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exponential form. This implies that they have proportional effects on 
the number of cases treated. 17 They also provide a control to reflect 
I 
the multiproduct nature of the hospital sector. Finally, a dummy 
variable for the London RHA's is included to reflect the special 
characteristics of the London hospitals. These characteristics include 
complexity of the cases treated, the advanced technology available that 
may not be available in other areas, and medical personnel with the 
latest skills. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function used to estimate weighted! 
non-psychiatric cases has the following form: 
Ln(Qw) 2_ Ln(A) + B1 Ln(NMW) + B2 Ln(HMS + HMC) + B3 Ln(BEDS) + 
t (YEAR)+ L (LONDON) 
This model differs from the first by adjusting the hospital output to 
reflect variations in casemix. The other variables serve the same 
purposes as they do in the first model. 
Table XIV presents the estimated production function frontiers· 
for the model in (1) above. The coefficients for NMW's are negative. 
They indicate that an increase of one percent in a region's nurse aqd 
(2) 
midwife staff will lead to approximately a 0.23 percent decrease in :the 
number of non-psychiatric cases treated. The coefficients for doctors 
and hospital beds have the expected positive signs. They infer thati a 
one percent increase in doctors and hospital bed_s will lead to 
increases in the number of cases treated of approximately 0.40 percJnt 
d O 83 . l 18 an • percent respective y. 
The sum of the elasticities for the labor and capital inputs 
equal 0.9823 or larger. This indicates approximately constant returns 
to scale. The positive coefficients for the time trend indicate 
I 
The negative coefficients for t!e increasing productivity over time. 
London dummy variable agree with the proposition that the London RH4-'s 
treat more complex and severe cases than their counterparts elsewhere, 
I 
decreasing the rates of output for these RHA's, given the level of 
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inputs. Lastly, the negative coefficients for the two casemix variables 
support the data which indicate that the national average lenghts of 
I 
stay for medical cases exceed the national average lengths of stay for 
all acute care cases combined while surgery cases have average lengths 
of stay _that are only slightly longer than the average for all cases 
b . d 19 com 1ne. 
Parameter 
Ln(CONSTANT 
Ln(NMW) 
Ln(HMS + HMC) 
Ln(BEDS 
YEAR 
LONDON 
MEDICAL CASES 
SURGICAL CASES 
TABLE XIV 
PRODUCTION FRONTIER ESTIMATES FOR DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE NON-PSYCHIATRIC CASES 
100% 98% 96% !95% 
-----------~--- 1974-1977 ---------~-----
1. 8393 2.1009 2.0858 2.0893 
-0.2763 -0.2334 -0.2345 -0.2309 
0.4093 0.3909 0.3906 0.8849 
0.8529 0.8249 0.8264 0.8295 
0.0436 0.0395 0.0397 o.p393 
-0.0462 -0.0433 -0.0438 -0.0419 
-3.4844 -3.4727 -3.4800 -3 .. 4590 
-0.1249 -0.0314 -0.0295 -0.0360 
I 
Number of Observations 56 55 54 53 
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Table XV presents the estimated production function frontiers for 
the model in (2) above. The coefficients for nurses and midwives (NMW) 
again are negative and quite large. 
TABLE XV 
PRODUCTION FRONTIER ESTIMATES FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
NON-PSYCHIATRIC CASES WEIGHTED BY CASEMIX AND 
OUTPATIENT VISITS CASE EQUIVALENTS 
Parameter 100% 98% 96% 95% 
----------------- 1974-1977 ---------------
Ln(CONSTANT) 1.3195 0.8979 0.1944 0.1755 
Ln(NMW) -0.3404 -0.3360 -0.4076 -0. 4096 
Ln (HMC + HMS) 0.1727 0.0843 0.0762 0.0761 
Ln(BEDS) 1.0576 1. 114 7 1.2397 1. 2431 
YEAR 0.0457 0.0520 0.0552 0.0553 
LONDON -0.0700 -0.0555 -0.0552 -0.0552 
Number of Observations 56 55 54 53 
The elasticities for doctors are now much smaller while the 
elasticities for beds are considerably larger. Furthermore, the large 
negative elasticity for nurses implies that a one percent increase in 
NMW's will result in a 0.4076 percent decrease in weighted output. In 
addition, the sum of the elasticities for the labor inputs equals 
-0.3314 while the sum of the elasticities for both labor and capital 
inputs equals 0.9083 in the 96 percent frontier and less in the 98 
percent and 100 percent frontiers. The coefficients for YEAR and LONDON 
20 
are the same sign but somewhat larger. 
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The Indices of RHA Hospital Sector Efficiency 
From the two production function frontiers estimated using linear 
I 
programming, indices of RHA hospital sector efficiency were constru~ted. 
Since the estimated coefficients for a given set of observations repre-
sent the production surface, actual RHA hospital sector output must 1 be 
I 
less than or equal to estimated output. The objectives of this section 
of the chapter are to describe the procedure of picking the set of 
coefficients for a given production frontier; to describe the consttuction 
I 
of the resulting efficiency indices; and to examine the simple corr~la-
tions between the efficiency indices and two measures of RHA medical 
care need. 
Forsund et al. note that the estimated frontier obtained by li,ear 
I 
. h . . • . . b . 21: programming tee n1ques 1s very sens1t1ve to extreme o servat1ons. · 
In attempting to avoid this problem, Timmer suggests deleting efficient 
observations, a small fraction at a time, to determine the level at: 
which the coefficients stabilize. 22 When the coefficients stabilize, 
the resulting frontier, which represents a certain percentage of th~ 
observations, is called a "probablistic frontier. 1123 Forsund et alJ 
note that the usefulness of this approach depends on the rate of change 
in the estimates decreasing rapidly as additional observations are 
deleted. 
Table XIV presented the results of this procedure for the j 
frontier using unweighted non-psychiatric cases. While the coefficients 
never all attain a constant set of values, the values roughly stabiJize 
at the 98 percent frontier. No added degree of stability results fJom 
deleting additional observations. In fact, on run 11, after deletiJg 
25 efficient observations from the previous 10 runs, the coefficienJs 
I 
attained similar values to those of the 98 percent frontier. Conse-
quently, the coefficients associated with the 98 percent frontier were 
chosen for this particular efficiency index (DQ). 
I 
Table XV presented the results of this procedure for the frontier 
using weighted non-psychiatric cases. Again, the coefficients never 
I 
attain a constant set of values. However, the coefficients attain I 
relative stability at the 96 percent frontier so this set of coeffit 
cients was used for the efficiency index (IQW). 
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I 
Since the actual levels of RHA hospital sector output must be less 
than or equal to the estimated levels of output, the efficiency index 
takes the following form: 
IQ .. l.J 
Where Q 
e .. l.J 
(Qe .. - Q .. ) I Q l.J e .. l.J l.J 
the estimated output of type i for RHA hospital sector j, 
(3) 
Qij the actual output of type i for RHA hospital sector j, and 
IQ .. l.J the associated index.
25 
For observations on the frontier, the index will be zero so the larger 
the index the larger the relative inefficiency of the particular 
hospital sector. 
The indices of relative efficiency ranged in value from zero t9 
2.22 percent for the weighted output index and zero to 1.44 percent! 
for the unweighted output index. The largest average index value wts 
I 0.560 percent for IQW while the average index value was 0.367 perceft 
I 
for IQ. As these figures indicate, the estimated relative efficiency 
I 
differences are small. But the coefficients of variation equal 1051 
I 
percent for IQW and 101 percent for IQ. This means that, although 
average relative inefficiency is small, considerable variation among 
the RHA hospital sectors exists. 
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Table XVI presents the simple correlations between the two 
efficiency indices and the age-sex and age-sex SMR adjusted population 
ratios. None of the correlations between the measures of need and the 
unadjusted output index (IQ) are statistically significant. However, 
the weighted output index correlations with these need indices are 
statistically significant at the five percent level. The negative 
coefficient for the age-sex adjusted population ratio indicates a small 
direct association between this need measure and increased RHA hospital 
sector efficiency. This might possibly reflect increased demand 
pressure on hospitals that result in increased rates of output. The 
positive coefficient for the age-sex SMR adjusted population ratio 
implies a small direct relation between this more complex need measure 
and hospital sector inefficiency. A possible explanation of this 
result may be that the second need measure better captures the severity 
of need and indicates that regions with greater need also have more 
cases requiring longer lengths of stay. The longer lengths of stay 
would show up in lower rates of output and might not be captured by 
the casernix controls built into the production functions. 
Relative RHA Hospital Sector Efficiency: 
Two Hypotheses 
This section of the chapter uses the efficiency indices developed 
above to test two hypotheses concerning relative regional efficiency. 
The first hypothesis states that excess demand will put pressure on a 
region's hospital sector to produce more output from a given amount of 
inputs and this result will show up as follows. Treating the supply of 
medical care as fixed in a given time period, RHA characteristics which 
increase the demand for medical care will be negatively related to the 
efficiency indices. The second hypothesis concerns the fixed nature 
I 
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of supply in a given time period. It states that hospital doctors will 
regulate their workload to some professionally designated level sin4e 
their compensation is not a function of output. Consequently, as the 
number of hospital beds per hospital doctor increases, the average 
length of stay will increase ·to regulate the doctors' workload. The 
following sections discuss the hypotheses in more detail and present 
I 
the empirical findings. 
TABLE XVI 
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE RHA HOSPITAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY. 
INDICES AND MEASURES OF RHA MEDICAL CARE NEED 
Efficiency Index 
Measure of Need 
Age-Sex Adjusted Population Ratio 
Age-Sex SMR Adjusted Population Ratio 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses. 
Excess Demand and Increased Relative 
Hospital Sector Efficiency 
IQW 
-0.3103 
( .011) 
0.2608 
( .028) 
IQ 
0. 1088 
(.215) 
-o.oo'4s 
(. 487) 
Waiting lists have been used as a traditional means to observe 
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excess demand. As discussed in earlier chapters, the concept of medical 
care need is a technological and relative concept so even though thb 
output of the NHS increased over time, waiting lists have not decreased 
in size. In fact, they have increased from 460,000 persons in 19491 to 
607,000 in 1976. 26 Consequently, waiting lists do not reflect all excess 
demand that exists at a particular point in time. 
To explain the behavior of waiting lists, Lindsay developed a 
I 
model that attempts to explain the increase in waiting lists in reswonse 
I 
. . . 27 to increases in system capacity. According to Lindsay, the decision 
to join the waiting list is a demand decision originating with the 
individual. The decision to join the list depends on the expected value 
of the hospital treatment to be obtained and the cost of joining th~ 
list. The expected value of hospital treatment decreases over time at 
a rate which depends on the type of disease. For diseases which cart be 
treated at home or by outpatient care, the value of treatment decreases 
quickly over time so these individuals will not join a waiting list 
that is too long. For diseases that must be treated in the hospital 
and do not deteriorate over time, the value of treatment decreases slowly 
2s! 
so they will join a longer queue than those in the first category. 
Lindsay regresses available beds per population and the change !in 
available beds per population on mean waiting time by disease categoiry 
and finds that diseases whose value of treatment decreases quickly Ofer 
time to be highly responsive to changes in be4 capacity. 29 He also 
finds that diseases whose values of hospital treatment decrease slowly 
I 
over time are responsive (in terms of mean waiting times) to higher bed 
capacities. As he hypothesizes, the NHS appears to be aware of 
resulting needs for this latter category. 
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On the other hand, Lindsay reasons.that the excess demand reflected 
30 by the waiting lists may be only a small part of total excess demand. 
As noted earlier, besides the value of the hospital treatment to be! 
obtained, the other factor in the individual's decision to present a 
demand to the NHS for treatment, or at least placement on the waiting 
list, is the cost of registering this demand with the NHS. The higher 
this cost, the less aware the system will be of the existing demandk. 
The lower this cost, the more aware the system will be and the more 
likely that it will respond to the demands by attempting to increas~ 
the output from a given endowment of resources. 
To test the hypothesis that the RHA hospital sectors respond to 
visible excess demands by increasing output from a given level of 
I 
inputs, this study regresses variables related to RHA demand character-
! 
istics on the efficiency indices. Factors that decrease the cost of 
registering a demand with the system or factors which lower the cost 
of care obtained from the system will be directly related to relative 
hospital sector efficiency (negatively related to the efficiency 
indices). Those factors which raise the value of care will increase 
demand and efficiency. 
Demand Variables Affecting the Cost of Registering Demands and 
Receiving Medical Care. Since the NHS relies on time prices as a 
rationing device, factors increasing the time involved in 
demand or receiving medical care will decrease the number 
registerijg 
of demands 
I 
presented to the system and vice versa. Additionally, factors which 
raise the cost of the time spent in registering demand or receiving. 
I 
care will have the same effect. Variables included in the model 
which are associated with time inputs are population density (POPDEN), 
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population per GP (PGP), and average length of stay (LOS). The variable 
I 
directly associated with the cost of time is wages not covered by 
employer guarantees to pay the individual when sick (WFP). 
As discussed in Chapter III, the time required to obtain a unil of 
medical care is composed of travel, waiting, and consumption times.! 
While the cost of registering a demand with the system may involve no 
current consumption of hospital services, the prospective patient must 
spend time with both a GP and a consultant to do so. This involves! 
some of each time component. Additionally, the longer the lengths of 
I 
stay in the region, the longer the waiting times required to obtain 
hospital treatment, and possibly the lower the value of that treatment, 
d d . f h f h d" · 31 epen ing o t e nature o t econ ition. 
The model the study employs to test the hypothesis uses POPDEN 
as a proxy for travel distance to the doctor. Acton found in a study 
of New York City's free health clinics that distance to the clinic 
acted as a price in determining the quantities of care demanded. 32 
Since this information is not available for the NHS, population density 
will be used as a proxy for travel distance to the doctor. As 
population density increases, the distance to the doctor should 
decrease. One problem, however, in using POPDEN for this purpose is 
I 
that higher population densities may also be associated with longer I 
waiting times. While shorter travel times should increase quantities 
I 
demanded, longer waiting times will have the opposite effect. 
To anticipate this possibility, two additional variables are 
included in the model. PGP enters as a proxy for waiting time and 
I 
the percentage of the RHA's wage and salary income from the agricul~ure, 
forestry, and fishing industries (PAFFWS) enters as a proxy for travel 
distance to the doctor, i.e., travel time. The reasoning behind 
including PAFFWS is that these industries are associated with rural! 
areas and, hence, larger distances to the doctor. 
I The unit cost of the time required to register a demand with the 
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system is the RHA wage and salary income per capita that is not covered 
by employer guarantees to pay the employees when they are sick. The 
I 
General Household Survey provided the percentage of employees that 
responded they "got paid when sick," by industry. 33 I These percentafes 
were multiplied by wage and salary income in each industry to obtain 
wages that would not be lost due to sickness. This amount was subtracted 
from total wages to obtain non-covered wages for each industry. These 
amounts were added together and then divided by RHA population to obtain 
non-covered wages per capits \WFP). This figure provides a crude 
measure of the average cost of time to prospective patients in a given 
region. 
However, since the above foregone earnings variable is fairly crude, 
I 
the proportions of wage and salary incomes associated with other industry 
groups are also included in the model. The percentage of non-covered 
wages varies by industry group. Industries accounting for larger stiares 
I 
of WFP will be associated with higher time prices. The variables are: 
construction industry wages share (PCWS); mining, quarrying, gas, 
electricity, and water industry wages share (MQGEWS); and service 
industry wages share (SERVWS). They are listed in decreasing order I 
of their contributions to the RHA's non-covered wages. 34 ! 
Two demand variables reflect the value of treatment to potenti11 
patients. The first variable, already discussed, is average length lof 
stay (LOS). The second variable is a proxy for quality. It is the 
i 
number of teaching districts in the region. Since teaching hospita\ls 
are associated with higher quality care, the demand for medical car\e 
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I 
should increase. However, to the extent that the case weighting inj the 
production function estimates does not adequately reflect the varia~ion 
in the severity of cases among regions, the likelihood of this proxy 
performing well decreases. 
Three variables in the model attempt to control for the availa~ility 
of substitute forms of medical care. The first two, the percentage of 
fulltime medical consultants (PFTHMC) and the percentage of fulltime 
hospital doctors below consultant grade (PFTHMS), are proxies for tTue 
availability of private practice sources of medical care. Acton found 
that the free clinics in New York City, with their long waits, were• 
I 
economically inferior goods while private practice physicians were ' 
I 
35 
normal goods. 
The third proxy for substitute forms of medical care is the ratio 
I 
of general practitioners to hospital doctors exists in a region, ge9eral 
practitioners may not refer patients to consultants, knowing that t~e 
chance they will be placed on a waiting list is small. Instead, th~y 
may choose to provide treatment for which hospital care is not 
absolutely required. 
The two Working Party indices of regional medical care need ent~r 
I 
the model to determine if these indices explain any variation in I 
regional efficiency. The first index, the age-sex adjusted populatipn 
I 
ratio (ASPOPR), is derived from hospital sector utilization rates for 
I 
different age and sex groups. The second index, the age-sex standar~ 
mortality ratio adjusted population ratio (ASSMRPR), weights the agetsex 
groups' utilization rates by the regions' standard mortality ratios for 
I 
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different diseases. The latter should more correctly measure regional 
medical care need than the first index. In addition, it may also 
account for variations in case severity not previously accommodated. 
While the expected sign for ASPOPR is unknown, one might argue thati the 
second variable should be directly correlated with the efficiency 
indices if it correctly takes into account variations in case severity 
not previously controlled for. On the other hand, if the index repre-
sents conditions that demanders are generally aware of, then the 
correlation would be negative, since persons in need are motivated to 
demand medical attention. 
The Empirical Findings: RHA Hospital Sector Efficiency and Excess 
Demand. Table XVII presents the regressions of the demand variables on 
the two efficiency indices. Four time price variables, WFP, PAFFWS, 
PGP, and LOS, have the correct statistically significant positive signs 
in both regressions. The results imply that as the time price increases 
and the value of the car.e decreases, the demands presented to the 
system decrease and this shows up as relative inefficiency. 
The conflicting influences of POPDEN on travel time and waiting 
time appear as small, non-statistically significant positive coefficients 
in both regressions. But PAFFWS does exhibit the expected positive sign 
in three of the four regressions. This lends support to its use as a 
I 
proxy for travel distance but this cannot be stated conclusively sin!ce 
the percentage of wages paid when sick in this industry equals the 
I percentage of wages paid when sick in the construction industry which 
also exhibits a large positive statistically significant coefficient. 
I 
Both industries rank lower than the others in terms of the percentag~ 
of wages paid when sick, implying that time prices are higher for their 
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TABLE XVII 
RHA HOSPITAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY AND MEDICAL CARE DEMAND 
Efficiency Index 
Independent Variables 
Constant Term 
Non-Covered Wages (WFP) 
Population Density (POPDEN) 
% AG-FOR-FISH Wages (PAFFWS) 
% Construction Wages (PCWS) 
% MIN-QUAR-UTIL Wages (PMQGEWS) 
% Service Sector Wages (PSERVWS) 
Population Per GP (PGP) 
Length of Stay (LOS) 
% Full-Time HMC's (PFTHMC) 
% Full-Time HMS's (PFTHMS) 
GP's per Hosp. Doctor (GPHD) 
Age-Sex Pop. Ratio (ASPOPR) 
Age-Sex SMR Pop. Ratio (ASSMRPR) 
# Teaching Districts (TDIST) 
Adjusted R-Square 
Number of Observations 
IQW 
-15.0053*** 
(-4.161) 
0.0082*** 
(4.704) 
0.0002 
(0.458) 
0 .1882*** 
(3.672) 
0.4443*** 
(6.071) 
-0.0487 
(-0. 77 5) 
0.0945*** 
(5.981) 
0.0012* 
( 1. 990) 
0.4485*** 
(6.889) 
0.0452*** 
(3.173) 
-0.0230 
(-1.070) 
0.0321*''(* 
(3.319) 
-0 .1192*** 
(-4.994) 
0.0555*** 
(3.083) 
0.0486 
(0.841) 
.883 
54 
IQ 
-10.56p0*** 
(-3.154) 
0.0041** 
(2.49tl) 
0.0004 
(0.903) 
0.2541*** 
(5 .056) 
I 
0.0942 
(1.3392) 
0.0007 
(0 .011) 
0.0323** 
(2 .139) 
0.0014** 
(2.312) 
0.2425*** 
(3. 96t) 
0.0318** 
(2.301) 
-0 .0211 
(-1.024) 
0.0045 
I (0.482) 
0.0235 
(1.027) 
-0.02:h 
(-1.203) 
0.0637 
(l.12i) 
.715 
55 
Note: 
I 
T-values .in parentheses; * = statistically significant at the 
10 percent level;**= statistically significant at the 5 pe~cent 
level;***= statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
workers. In any case, the performance of each of these variables ik 
I 
consistent which work to decrease the quantities of medical care 
demanded. 
The performance of the other two industry variables is not as 
satisfactory. The PMQGEWS variable has the hypothesized sign in the 
! 
weighted output regression but the coefficient is not statistically 
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significant. A different problem occurs with the PSERVWS variable. It 
is statistically significant in both regressions but has an unexpected 
sign. Since most service industry employees reported they got paid 
when sick, their foregone earnings rate should be low, resulting in a 
lower time price. Multicollinarity may be at fault here, because both 
variables are highly correlated with each other (-0.662), as well as 
with several other variables in the model. For example, the correlation 
between PSERVWS and PFTHMC is -0.745. This implies that service 
industry employment is highly correlated with the availability of 
substitute private practice alternatives, whose influence may offset 
the effect of the higher percentage of wages not lost due to sickness. 
For the three variables entered as proxies for substitute form~ of 
medical care, GPHD has the correct sign and a statistically significant 
I 
coefficient in the regression on the weighted output efficiency index. 
On the other hand, PFTHMS has the correct sign but the coefficients iare 
not statistically significant. The third proxy for substitute medical 
care, PFTHMC, has a positive sign and is statistically significant in 
I 
I both regressions. The coefficients indicate that as the percentage of 
hospital medical consultants that work for the NHS full-time decrea9es, 
I 
efficiency increases. One plausible interpretation of this result is 
that the existence of private practice, by providing a substitute to 
NHS care, motivates the NHS to try harder. 
The coefficients for the two need variables were statistically 
significant in the weighted output efficiency index regression but 6ot 
in the other. ASPOPR appears to act as a demand variable and not as a 
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case severity variable. This should not be surprising since it is based 
on utilization rates only. Also, ASSMRPR seems to be measuring case 
severity in the regression on IQW. 
TDIST may be a poor proxy for the influence of quality on the 
demand for medical care. On the other hand, the increased complexity 
I 
of cases treated by teaching hospitals would tend to increase LOS. 
This would tend to decrease the demand for medical care. These offsetting 
influences, like the case of the POPDEN variable, tend to explain the 
poor performance of this variable. 
Lastly, the adjusted R-squares indicate that these demand variables 
explain a significant portion for the interregional variations in 
hospital sector efficiency. The generally consistent performance of 
the demand variables is encouraging. Their performance lends strong 
support to the excess demand hypothesis. 
Hospital Doctors, Workload, and Variation 
of Average Lengths of Stay 
The significance of average length of stay (LOS) in explaining 
interregional variations in relative hospital sector efficiency leaqs 
to the second hypothesis to be tested. This hypothesis states that 
NHS hospital doctors will regulate their workload to some professionally 
I 
acceptable level since their compensation is not directly a function of 
36 
output. i To maximize their utility, they will be motivated to meet only 
i 
the standards set by their profession and, to some extent, NHS 
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administrators. i While clinical freedom allows each doctor discretipn in 
I 
using NHS resources to treat his patients, it will bias behavior toward 
meeting professional standards and away from any NHS objectives tha~ may 
be in conflict with those standards. Consequently, given the uncerr 
tainty often associated with the treatment of illness, clinical freedom, 
coupled with utility maximization, will bias doctors toward longer 
37 lengths of stays as opposed to higher output rates. 
To test this hypothesis, the following general model will be U$ed: 
i 
LOS.= F[(BEDS/HMC) ., (BEDS/NMW) ., (HMS/HMC) ., PFTHMCj, 
J J J J 
(GP /HMC) . , IQ .. , ASSMRPR., YEAR] 
J l.J J 
where the variables are defined as before. The model eoncentrates bn 
hospital medical consultants because junior grade hospital doctors kre 
i 
i 
responsible to a consultant and presumably, it is the consultants that 
(4) 
make the final decisions concerning the disposal of cases. No management 
hierarchy ex:istsamong consultants so only informal controls, such a~ 
38 
consultants distinction awards, exist among consultants. Consequently, 
it is at the consultant grade that true clinical freedom exists. 
The hypothesis to be tested maintains that as the number of be~s 
per hospital doctor (consultant) increases, the average length of sfay 
will increase. The largest part of the workload for a consultant I 
I 
probably occurs at the beginning of the hospital stay. An increase1in 
I 
the number of beds available per consultant, holding length of stayl 
! 
constant, will increase the workload of the consultant and decreaselthe 
I 
amount of leisure time consumed. If the consultant receives no dir~ct 
compensation for this extra workload, then he will not be as motivated 
to accept the higher workload. 
The consultants' ability to shift workload to other NHS employees 
I 
depends on the availability of these persons. If the nursing staff 1 
bears the responsibility for most of the work following the initial
1 
treatment phase, the ability of the HMC's to shift workload to the 
nursing staff by increasing average lengths of stay will depend on the 
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ratio of hospital beds to nurses (BEDS/NMW). The lower this ratio, the 
greater capacity for the nursing staff to handle a given workload. In 
fact, the workload for the nursing staff may also decrease as LOS 
increases. If this is the case, the nursing staff may also favor 
longer average lengths of stay. Consequently, the expected sign for 
BEDS/NMW is negative. 
Another variable that must be controlled for in testing the 
hypothesis is the ratio of junior hospital doctors to hospital medical 
consultants (HMS/HMC). As this ratio increases, the more supervisory 
workload a consultant has: One would expect this type of workload, 
which must be performed, to limit the capacity to take on new cases. 
Therefore, this proxy for supervisory workload should be positively 
associated with LOS. 
The percentage of full-time consultants in the region (PFTHMC) is 
entered in the model to control for private practice demands placed on 
the consultant. If private practice work is fee for service, the 
I 
consultant may give it priority over salaried NHS work. Using NHS work 
to fill in for a lack of private work, the consultants may increase 
I 
lengths of stays for NHS patients when private workload increases. If 
this is the case, then the expected sign for PFTHMC is negative. 
The consultants must also spend time determining who should be I 
put on waiting lists for future hospital treatment. Since the number 
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of general practitioners in the region are directly associated with,the 
I 
number of referals to consultants, the ratio of general practitionets 
to hospital medical consultants (GP/BMC) enters the model to control for 
I 
the referal workload of consultants. The consultant may respond to this 
workload in two ways. First, since this workload takes time away from 
treating hospital patients, consultants may respond by increasining 
average lengths of stay. Alternatively, if referals place pressure on 
consultants to increase output by making them aware of large amount$ of 
unmet needs, they may decrease lengths of stay in order to increase I 
output. This latter motivation would seem less likely if consultants 
are workload minimizers, as hypothesized. If the first motivation 
dominates, then the expected sign of GP/HMC is positive. If the second 
motivation dominates, the sign will be negative. 
In addition to the above variables, LOS will be affected by the 
general efficiency of the RHA hospital sectors. As previously demon-
, 
strated, LOS is directly associated with relative hospital sector 
inefficiency. To control for this variable, the index of relative 
efficiency (IQ .. ) will be included in the model. As before, LOS should 
J..J 
increase directly with the size of the efficiency index. 
The age-sex SMR adjusted population ratio measure of regional 
medical care need (ASSMRPR) is included in the model to determine if 
consultants recognize medical need as indicated by this index. As 
discussed earlier, if the need index measures the severity of cases 
treated that has not been accounted for in the efficiency indices, 
then it should be directly associated with average length of stay. 
Lastly, a time trend variable (YEAR) is included to control for 
improvements in medical technology and treatment methods. Since 
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improved techniques will affect doctors attitudes concerning the appro-
priate treatment of cases, this knowledge will act to restrain 
I 
consultants from increasing average lengths of stay. Combined with] the 
increased productivity offered by advances in medical care technoloky, 
the average length of stay should decrease as time advances, implying 
I 
a negative regression coefficient for time. 
The Empirical Results: Consultant Behavior and Average Length! of 
Stay. Table XVIII presents the results for the LOS regressions usihg 
I 
the four efficiency indices discussed earlier and the ASPOPR need i~dex. 
As the adjusted R-squares indicate, the model explains a large propor-
tion of the variation of average lengths of stay among the regions. 
In addition, most of the variables are statistically significant anf 
have the expected signs. 
The coefficients for the BEDS/HMC variable is statistically 
significant in both.regressions and have the expected positive sign, 
These results support the hypothesis that HMC's do use LOS to regulate 
workload. The small size of the coefficient may be deceiving. This 
implies an elasticity coefficient of 0.23 to O.SO. This indicates 
that a one percent increase in the BEDS/HMC ratio will increase LOS 
from 0.23 to a.so percent. 
The BEDS/NMW variable has the expected negative sign in both 
i 
regressions. The negative sign indicates that as the ratio of bedsi 
to nurses falls, average lengths of stay increase. While these I 
coefficients are not statistically significant, their negative sign1 
I 
are consistent with the hypothesis that doctors shift workload to 
nurses. The coefficients indicate that a one percent decrease in the 
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TABLE XVIII 
I HOSPITAL DOCTORS, LENGTHS OF STAY, AND THE ASSMRPR NEED MEASURE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY (LOS) 
Efficiency Index IQW IQ I 
Constant 38.1862*** 33.4322*** 
(5.297) (4.732) 
Beds/Consultants (BEDS/HMC) 0 .0810* 0.1749*** 
( 1. 860) (5.420) 
Beds/Nurses (BEDS/NMW) -1.1282 -0.7920 
(-1.370) (-0. 951) 
Doctors/Consultants (HMS/HMC) 1.5255*** 1. 8211*** 
(3. 335) (4.083) 
% Full-Time Consultants (PFTHMC) -0.0458*** -0.0530*** 
(-4.233) (-4.910) 
GP's/Consultants (GP/HMC) -1. 5508*** -2.8724*** 
(-2.885) (-8. 694) 
Efficiency Index (IQij) 0.6190*** 0. 7147*** 
(3. 550) (4.425) 
Age-Sex SMR Pop. Ratio (ASSMRPR) 0.0088 0.0140 
(0. 628) (1.087) 
Year -0.3383*** -0.2839*** 
(-3.826) (-3.276) 
Adjusted R-square .808 .820 
Number of Observations 54 55 
Note: T-values in parentheses;*= statistically significant at the 
10 percent level;**= statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level;***= statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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BEDS/NMW ratio will increase LOS by 0.120 to 0.084·percent, a 
I 
relatively 
I 
small response. I 
The HMS/ID·1C variable has the expected positive sign and is 
I 
statistically significant at the one percent level in both regressibns. 
The elasticities range from 0.28 to 0.34 percent. This indicates that 
a one percent increase in the supervisory workload of HMC's will le~d to 
a 0.28 to 0.34 percent increase in average lengths of stay. 
The proxy for referral workload (GP/HMC) has a relatively larg~r 
potenti~l impact on LOS than the variables discussed above. In elasti-
city terms, a o~e percent increase in the ratio, ceteris paribus, will 
decrease LOS from 0.37 to 0.68 percent. Additionally, the negative1sign 
indicates that HMC's respond to referral workload from GP's by 
decreasing LOS, presumably to enable the system to operate at a hig~er 
i 
rate of output. 
The efficiency indices (IQW and IQ), PFTHMC, and ASS~.IRPR have very 
small relative impacts on LOS. The elasticities indicate that a one 
I 
percent increase in relative efficiency, ceteris paribus, will lead 1 to 
only a O. 0003 to O. 0004 percent decrease in LOS. For a one percent : 
I 
decrease on the number of full-time HMC's, LOS will increase 0.0039. 
to 0.0045 percent. And for a one percent increase in ASSMRPR, LOS I 
I increases 0.0009 to 0.0014 percent. Although two of these variable' 
I 
are statistically significant at the one percent level in both 
regressions, their quantitative impact is negligible. 
The time trend (YEAR) variable's coefficient is statistically 
I 
significant at better than the one percent level in all regressions~ 
The results indicate that lengths of stay have been falling by 0.28 
to 0.34 days per year. This implies that improvements in medical 
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technology and treatments have increased the productivity of hospital 
stays and resulted in lower average lengths of stay. 
An Integration of the Empirical Findings 
The estimated production function frontiers provide relative 
efficiency indices which indicate that considerable variation in rela-
tive efficiency of RHA hospital sectors exists. As hypothesized, 
I 
interregional variation in these efficiency indices can be explaine? in 
large part by variation in demand factors from one region to another~ 
' The study finds that those factors which increase the demand or quantity 
demanded of hospital care are directly associated with relative efficiency 
and vice versa. 
The study also finds, however, that hospital sector response to 
excess demands is affected by the behavior of hospital doctors. The 
study hypothesizes that hospital doctors will regulate their workloads 
by varying average lengths of stay. The regressions of hospital beds 
per hospital doctor and hospital beds per nurse and midwife on average 
length of stay support this hypothesis. As the ratio of hospital beds 
to hospital doctors increases, increasing doctor workload, average 
lengths of stay increase. Since longer lengths of stay are associated 
I 
with relative hospital sector inefficiency, workload regulation is one 
I 
source of relative inefficiency and makes NHS hospitals less sensitive 
to excess demand pressures. Workload regulation, then, helps explain 
why the output elasticities for nurses and midwives were negative in 
both production function estimates. An increase in the number of 
nurses in the region provides more workload shifting capacity. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation has two purposes. The first is to consider the 
contributions to economic theory related to the public provision of 
health care, the zero-money price rationing of health care, and the 
separation of the concept of health care need from health care demand. 
The second major purpose of the dissertation is to empirically investi-
gate the NHS's performance in three areas. The first area examines!the 
allocation of health care resources among geographic regions on the 
basis of three criteria of equity. The second area evaluates the 
relative efficiency of the regions' hospital sectors and the third 
explores the relationship between the behavior of hospital doctors and 
hospital sector efficiency. By accomplishing these purposes, the 
dissertation seeks to provide insight into the difficulties of meeting 
the conflicting goals of simultaneously insuring access to health c~re, 
eliminating the financial risk of serious illness, and controlling health 
care costs. The British National Health Service represents an ongo~ng 
attempt to accomplish these tasks. 
This final chapter first brings together the relevant contributions 
I 
to the economic literature. It then summarizes the findings from the 
empirical research. Finally, it presents the conclusions of the study 
along with some recommendations for future research. 
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Summary 
Chapter II discusses medical care and market failure. Market 
failure can occur both with and without externalities related to the 
consumption of medical care. Three possible causes of market failure 
exist, even in the absence of externalities. They are: the existence 
of irrational health care consumers; uncertainty in the diagnosis and 
treatment of disease; and the competitive behavior of insurance co~panies 
and resulting overinsurance. 
Culyer notes that what is witlely perceived as irrationality on the 
part of health care consumers is usually not irrationality at all ~ut 
consumer ignorance. 1 Since health care information is costly to obtain, 
rational consumers will only obtain information to the point where 
their marginal benefits equal their marginal costs. i Behavior attributed 
I 
to ignorance; then, does not imply market failure per se. Only if an 
individual is insane, unconscious, or knows with certainty that the 
marginal benefits of health care exceed marginal costs and refuses! 
treatment would that person be considered irrational. Culyer concludes 
that the existence of these persons is not a sufficient condition to 
justify replacement of consumer sovereignty with some other allocation 
h . 2 mec anism. 
I Market failure due to uncertainty in the diagnosis and treatm¢nt 
I 
of disease concerns the issue of whether the consumer can accurately 
equate marginal benefits to marginal costs. Two institutions exisf to 
' deal with this problem. The first is the doctor-patient relationship 
I and the second is health insurance. 
When the doctor-patient relationship is complete, the consumet's 
I 
demand for medical care through the doctor will be identical to hi 
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own demand if he had the doctor's knowledge. But the literature notes 
that fee-for-service compensation mechanisms may create a conflict of 
interest and result in the consumption of health care past the point 
where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. The literature concludes 
that replacing fee-for-service compensation with the kinds of profit 
incentives built into pre-paid health care plans would help prevent abuse 
of the doctor-patient relationship. 
Health insurance prevents significant financial losses associated 
with serious illnesses and increases access to health care. It help:s the 
consumer equate marginal benefits and marginal costs by eliminating the 
uncertainty associated with the costs of treating a serious illness. 
Market failure can result when either there is too little or too much 
health insurance: The former results when actual insurance premiums 
exceed actuarily fair premiums due to loading changes, moral hazard, 
and risk-pooling. The latter results from the non-profit structure.of 
the hospital industry and the competitive behavior of insurance companies. 
The presence of persons who choose to self-insure does not provide a 
sufficient case for market failure. The literature notes that only when 
advantages from increased risk-spreading or economies of scale in 
administration exist would public provision of insurance be justified. 3 
On the other hand, the government can take a positive role in curbing 
over-insurance by providing insurance companies with information 
concerning the amounts of health insurance purchased by individuals. 
This information would allow companies to adjust premiums according 
to expected losses and motivate individuals not to over-insure. 4 In 
addition, the government could set coinsurance rates and deductibl4s to 
provide consumers with economic incentives to reduce over-consumption 
of health care. 5 
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Chapter II also considers market failure associated with three types 
of externalities concerning health care. The first type of externality 
concerns public health programs and little disagreement in the literature 
exists concerning the case for government. The second type of externality 
concerns whan Weisbrod calls option demand. 6 Society benefits from the 
hospital sector's ability to satisfy peak demands. Consequently, excess 
capacity provides external benefits that will not be realized unless 
payment is received from potential customers as well as current customers. 
The NHS represents one possible solution to the problem but the private 
market alternative of pre-paid health care also exists as an alternative. 7 
The third type of externality Chapter II discusses concerns the 
external benefits generated by an individual's consumption of heal~h 
care. This is essentially a case of interdependent utility functions 
where one person's or a group's utility is affected by another's 
consumption of medical care. The literature discusses two types of 
interdependency. What Culyer calls the traditional argument treats 
the object person's or group's consumption of medical care as the source 
f h 1 . 8 o t e externa ity. The interdependency is the object's consumption of 
medical care. Per-unit subsidies provide a least-cost approach to 
motivating increases in medical care consumption. 9 The second type of 
' 
interdependency concerns the equal distribution of medical care amdng 
all members of society. Lindsay and Buchanan note that if this type 
of externality is the relevant one, per-unit subsidies are not the 
least-cost approach to internalizing the externality. The least-cdst 
I 
approach requires subsidies to the indigent and some form of rationing 
for the other members of society. 10 
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Chapter III presents the concepts of demand and need for medical 
I 
care and discusses how these concepts work in the NHS framework. The 
demand for medical care connotates consumer sovereignty while the Il!eed 
for medical care refers to a third party's evaluation of a person's 
di . 11 con tion. Jeffers, Bognanno, and Bartlett point out that the concept 
of medical care need used by health care professionals will not gen!erally 
act as a constraint on the quantity of health care demanded. 12 And, 
as noted in the same discussion, the founders of the NHS did not 
recognize this fact and falsely assumed that need was simple to det!ermine 
and rank on a priority basis. Since this is not the case, the zero-
money pricing system adopted by the NHS to ensure equal access to health 
care by all persons of equal need faces serious difficulty in meeting 
this objective since demand would act to constrain the -actual needsl 
presented to the system. In practice, the NHS ranks those needs it can 
categorize among those persons that demand health care from the 
zero-money pricing system. 
As noted above, if the relevant externality is the equality of the 
distribution of health care, then the least-cost way to internalize 
this externality is to provide consumption subsidies to the indigen1t 
while rationing the other members of society. Time prices provide a 
means of accomplishing both objectives. I To the extent that they vary 
directly with income, they will increase the number of demands pres~nted 
to the health care system by the indigent while decreasing the 
quantities demanded by the higher income groups. As the time prici~g 
analysis demonstrates, time pricing can increase consumption equalilty 
between income groups and promote the NHS' s objective of allocating; 
health care on the basis of medical care need. But the analysis also 
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notes that time prices can increase inequality between income groups if 
time prices do not vary directly with income. Additionally, time prices 
can increase consumption inequality within the same income group if 
the proportions of total income accounted by unearned income vary 
significantly within income groups. 
Chapter IV seeks to determine if the NHS is attempting to allocate 
health care among geographic regions on the basis of need. As Culyer 
and Cooper note, it is unrealistic to expect the NHS to allocate 
resources among regions so as to compensate for all demand variables and 
1 h . b . 13 ensure equa access on tis as1s. The simple objective of this 
chapter is to determine if the NHS is attempting to meet its equity 
objective in terms of the allocation of resources among the geographic 
regions and in terms of the outputs of the hospital sectors of those 
regions. 
The chapter evaluates the NHS's performance using three measures 
of equity. The first and simplest measure is equal per-capita 
allocations based on crude populations. The second measure is based 
on each region's population's age-sex structure's hospital utilization 
rates. The third measure adjusts the second by standardized mortality 
ratios (SMR) for specific disease categories. 
In terms of expenditures per capita, the equality of the distri-
bution of operating expenditures improved during the 1974-1977 period 
using both the crude population index and the age-sex SMR population 
based index. The equality of the distribution of capital expenditures 
decreased. The study also finds no evidence that this increased 
inequality represents attempts to redress past regional inequalities 
in the distribution of hospital beds. 
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The research also indicates a general improvement in the regional 
distribution of nurses and midwives, junior hospital doctors, hospital 
medical consultants, and general practitioners using the crude popula-
tion index. But there was no improvement in the distribution of 
hospital beds among the regions. Using the age-sex adjusted population 
need measure, the findings indicate a very high positive correlation 
between this index and the number of general practitioners per capita 
but not for the other manpower categories or for hospital beds. 
When the age-sex SMR. adjusted population need measure is used, 
, the study finds significant positive correlations for nurses and midwives 
and for hospital beds. The latter correlation for hospital beds indicates 
that the historical distribution of hospital beds inherited by the NHS 
corresponds fairly well with the geographic distribution of medical 
care need, as measured by this index. This finding is encouraging, 
given the low level of capital spending by the NHS. 
Two measures of regional medical care output indicate some improve-
ment in equality using the crude population need index. The findings 
indicate decreases in regional inequality in both the number of discharges 
and deaths per 1000 population and in the number of cases treated per 
available hospital bed. In addition, there is evidence of improved 
performance in terms of the second need measure when one controls for 
casemix and average lengths of stay. A statistically significant, 
positive, partial correlation exists between this need index and the 
number of discharges and deaths per 1000 population. Unfortunately, 
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there is no evidence of increased equity among regions using these output 
measures and the age-sex SMR adjusted population need measure. 
Chapter V presents the empirical research concerning the relative 
efficiency of the regions' hospital sectors and the behavior of NHS 
hospital doctors concerning average lengths of stay per case treated. 
With respect to relative efficiency, the study hypothesizes that 
hospitals will directly respond to demand pressure by increasing output 
I 
and this will show up as increased efficiency. To test this hypothesis, 
demand variables are regressed on efficiency indices constructed from 
production function estimates for the regions' hospital sectors. 
To construct the indices, the study uses two Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, estimated using linear programming techniques. 
The first model controls for the multiproduct nature of hospital output 
by including casemix proportions as independent variables where the 
dependent variable is the number of cases treated. The second model 
controls for the multiproduct nature by weighting hospital sector 
output by average cost per case. Both estimates indicate that 
hospital beds have the greatest impact on hospital sector output with 
the number of hospital doctors having the next largest impact. They 
I 
also indicate that the number of nurses employed has a negative eff!ect 
on output, suggesting that NHS doctors may shift workload to NHS 
nurses in order to regulate workload to some desired level. The third 
area of empirical research tests this hypothesis. 
The regressions of the demand variables on the efficiency indiJces 
support the hypothesis that hospitals respond to demand pressures. i 
Adjusted R-squares indicate that the demand variables explain approxi-
mately 72 to 88 percent of the interregional variation in the 
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efficiency indices. The findings also indicate that the variables 
associated with time prices, including proxies for potential lost 
earnings due to illness and waiting times, vary directly with the level 
of relative hospital sector inefficiency. This means that as time 
prices increases, the number of demands presented to the NHS decreases, 
reducing the demand pressure on hospitals with a resultant decrease in 
output. The two measures of regional medical care need included in the 
model, the age-sex and age-sex SMR adjusted need measures, were 
statistically significant in the regression on the weighted output 
efficiency index but not in the other. They have opposite signs and 
their small elasticity indicates that need, as measured, has little 
impact on relative efficiency. 
The second hypothesis tested states that NHS doctors will regulate 
their workload to some professionally acceptable level since their 
compensation is not directly a function of output. The study hypothe-
sizes that they will do this by varying average lengths of stay. 
Consequently, hospital doctor behavior affects the response of the 
region's hospital sector to excess demands. The study finds, after 
controlling for other variables that would affect doctor workload and 
behavior, that average lengths of stay vary directly with the number 
of beds per hospital doctor. Consequently, varying lengths of stay to 
regulate workload represents one source of relative inefficiency. 
In addition, this finding helps explain why the output elasticities 
for nurses and midwives were negative in both production function 
estimates. An increase in the number of nurses in the region provides 
more workload shifting capacity. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Future Research 
The empirical findings indicate that fixed salary schemes that do 
not reflect differences in workload result in adaptive behavior that 
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can result in inefficiency. If fixed salaries are retained, then health 
care planners should recognize increased workloads by paying higher 
salaries in under-doctored regions. The use of a single contract rate 
for doctors and other personnel ignores the interregional variation in 
potential workloads and working environments. 
In addition, more work needs to be directed toward determining the 
causes of relative efficiency differences among regions. The data used 
in this study necessitated several simplifying assumptions concerning 
the distribution of hospital resources among the regions. The production 
function estimates could be biased to the extent that the estimated 
resource distributions differ from actual resource distributions. 
A preferable approach would use individual hospitals of a given type 
in a region to estimate a stochastic production frontier for the region. 
The stochastic frontier would allow for the possibility that the 
regional efficiency differences calculated in this study may be, at 
least partially, accounted for by factors outside the NHS's control. 14 
By estimating this type of production function for each region, one 
could be more confident of the efficiency differences among the regions 
and consequently, have a better index for evaluating the causes of 
these differences. 
As the theoretical and empirical work of this dissertation 
indicates, attempting to simultaneously attain the three goals of 
insuring access to health care, eliminating financial risks associated 
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with serious illness, and limiting the growth of health care costs is 
certainly a formidable task. If one pays no attention to supply, 
attaining the first two objectives compromises the third objective of 
controlling health care costs. The third party payment mechanisms used 
to attain the first two objectives motivate inefficient use of resources. 
Over-insurance, by driving a wedge between the price received by the 
supplier and the price paid by the consumer, encourages a continued 
and undesirable expansion of the health care sector. Withou controls 
which limit the expansion of this sector, we pay a larger and larger 
price for the ideal that all persons who need care should receive care. 
As the review of the literature indicates, the NHS solution 
represents only one alternative to this end. Supply-side constraints 
thought to allocate scarce health care resources on the basis of need 
are only partially effective for two reasons. As currently applied, 
the concept of need used by health care professionals lacks effective 
benefit-cost criteria incorporated into the decision making proces~. 
The work of Culyer in this area should be extended to develop 
operational definitions of need that can be applied uniformly by NHS 
15 personnel. Second, the NHS appears to allocate resources on the 
basis of need only among the subset of the population willing to pay 
I 
the time price. And while time prices provide one possible means of 
promoting equal access, there is little direct evidence on whether 
they do increase equality in the consumption of medical care among 
I 
different income groups. Future research on the NHS should seek to 
determine how effective the time-price only system is in promoting 
equity. If the theoretical literature on the subject is valid, 
society may be best served by a system that offers many different time 
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and money price combinations, allowing the individual consumer to choose 
his own least-cost alternative and avoiding some of the potential 
inequities that can result in a time price only system where foregone 
earnings rates do not necessarily vary directly with demands for health 
care. This multiprice system, combined with effective operational 
definitions of need, would promote the equal access objective of the 
NHS as well as a more uniform distribution of NHS resources on the basis 
of medical care need. 
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